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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LUIS PENA-FLORES, 
Defendant/Petitioner, 
Case No. 20010056-SC 
Priority No. 13 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
found as follows: American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 14 P.3d 6985 
cert granted, 26 P.3d 235 (2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that a person can be guilty of 
interference with a peace officer under Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 even when the 
underlying arrest or detention is later determined to be unlawful so long as the officer was 
acting within the scope of his authority and the detention or arrest had the indicia of being 
lawful? This Court reviews the interpretation of statutes for correctness. State v. Redd, 
1999 UT 108 at If 11, 992 P.2d 986. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decisions of the 
Court of Appeals for correctness and affords no deference to its conclusions. State v. 
James, 2000 UT 80 at fl 85 13 P.3d 576. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 (1999) 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order; 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Luis Pena-Flores appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his 
conviction from Fourth District Court for interference with a peace officer, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Luis Pena-Flores was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court, 
American Fork Department, on August 17, 1999, with Interference with a Peace Officer, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 and American 
Fork City Ordinance § 76-8-305 (R. 6). 
On October 8, 1999, a trial was held before the Honorable Howard Maetani (R. 
17-18, 32). At the close of the City's case, Pena-Flores moved to dismiss the charge 
against him on two grounds: One, that Pena-Flores had not interfered with the lawful 
arrest or detention of anyone present (R. 32 at 24). Two, that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that Pena-Flores' actions impeded the arrest of anyone present 
(R. 32 at 29). The City responded that Pena-Flores lacked standing "to contest the arrest 
or detention of other persons" and that he only had standing to contest "the arrest or 
detention of himself' (R. 32 at 25-26). 
The trial court convicted Pena-Flores under subsection (3) of § 76-8-305 (R. 32 at 
32). Judge Maetani concluded that whether the officers made a lawful arrest is not the 
issue; and that the true issue was whether Pena-Flores "impeded the officer's performing 
any act to detain individuals and to gather information to then effectuate a lawful arrest" 
(R. 32 at 32-33). Pena-Flores was ordered to pay a $100.00 fine and was placed on court 
probation for twelve months (R. 19-23). 
On October 12, 1999, Pena-Flores appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (R. 24-25). On November 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed his 
conviction. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 14 P.3d 698. 
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On January 16, 2001, Pena-Flores petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. 
This Court granted the petition on May 18, 2001. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 26 
P.3d 235. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Andre Leavitt, a police officer with Provo City, testified that he was currently 
assigned to the Utah County Task Force on gang activity and narcotics (R. 32 at 4). As 
part of his duties, Leavitt was in American Fork on July 10, 1999, to assist the city with 
their Steel Days carnival in case any fights broke out between rival gangs (R. 32 at 4-5). 
Leavitt testified that they had received information that a Payson gang may be planning to 
retaliate against an American Fork gang (R. 32 at 5-6). The officers were also planning 
to ID. "all of the people who were hanging out with known gang members, who through 
association could have been" at a fight the previous night at the carnival or at a fight the 
previous week in Pleasant Grove (R. 32 at 11-12). 
Leavitt testified that approximately ten officers with the task force were present at 
the carnival (R. 32 at 6). The officers were dressed in black shirts and hats that had 
"Police" written on them (Id.). The officers identified gang members from Provo, 
Payson, and American Fork (R. 32 at 6-7). The officers escorted these gang members 
from the back corner of the carnival up to the front (R. 32 at 7-8). The officers had the 
kids fill out field interview cards and Leavitt took photographs of them (R. 32 at 8). No 
illegal activity had been observed by the officers at the carnival (R. 32 at 23). 
While the kids were being detained by the officers, Pena-Flores told them that they 
did not have to answer any questions from the officers or allow them to take their pictures 
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In affirming Pena-Flores* conviction the Court of Appeals invented a test which 
ignores the plain language of the interference statute and its legislative history, and which 
cites to language from an entirely unrelated statute. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 violates the Fourth .Amendment by 
reading out of the statute the requirement that the interference or impedance be with a 
"lawful" detention or arrest. 
Finally, Pena-Flores asserts that his conviction must be reversed because the police 
lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain the gang members and that 
accordingly he did not interfere with—or impede—officers seeking to effect a lawful 
detention. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-8-305 IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE, THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, OR THIS COURT'S 
DECISIONS IN STATE V. BRADSHAWAND STATE V. GARDNER 
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the officers' encounter 
with the gang members was a level-two detention and therefore, it constituted a "seizure" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion to be lawful. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 11. 
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the use of 'lawful' in section 76-8-305 
does not automatically incorporate this standard in determining whether a person is guilty 
of interfering with a peace officer" and that "[defendant's argument that the statute 
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language in its interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305. Recently this Court 
reiterated its long-standing approach to interpreting statutes: When faced with a question 
of statutory construction "we seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of 
the purpose the act was meant to achieve. In doing so, we look [first] to the plain 
language of the [statute].,. We need not look beyond the plain language of [the] provision 
unless we find some ambiguity in it." State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68 at \ 7, 427 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (citations omitted). Pena-Flores asserts that the plain language of § 76-8-305 is 
not ambiguous and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the plain language of 
the statute. 
Moreover, a person is guilty of a crime only if the person's actions and state of 
mind fit within the statutory defmtional elements of the crime. See Gardner, 814 P.2d at 
574. The necessary elements for conviction under of § 76-8-305(3) are as follows: 
1. Pena-Flores had knowledge, or by reasonable care should have had 
knowledge that 
2. the police officers were seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention 
3. of himself or another; and 
4. he interfered by refusing to refrain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
The plain language of the statute creates a crime only when there is interference with 
police officers who are "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention" (emphasis added). 
In contrast, interference with officers who are effecting an unlawful detention or arrest 
does not violate the statute. Any other interpretation would "'render [the term lawful] 
mere surplusage.'" Gardner, 814 P.2d at 577 (J. Stewart, dissenting) (quoting State v. 
Wilkerson, 755 P.2d 471, 477 (Idaho Ct. App.), affd, 766 P.2d 1238 (Idaho 1988)). Pena-
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Flores asserts that for a detention or arrest to be lawful it must be supported by reasonable 
and articulable suspicion or probable cause. 
The legal definition of the term "lawful" supports this reading. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "lawful" as "[n]ot contrary to law; permitted by law." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY at 892 (7th ed. 1999). Black's similarly defines "lawful arrest" as "[t]he 
taking of a person into legal custody either under a valid warrant or on probable cause." 
Id. at 104. Clearly the term "lawful" connotes a seizure or detention supported by 
reasonable suspicion or an arrest based on probable cause. 
Moreover, any definition of the term "lawful" must be examined in relation to what 
is permissible under the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Utah courts 
have repeatedly recognized that there are three levels of "constitutionally permissible 
encounters between police officers and the public": 
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; however the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 
879, 881 (Utah App. 1989) and State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). 
Accordingly, any examination of the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 
and the term "lawful" must be made with consideration as to what is constitutionally 
permissive. For a police detention of citizens to be lawful under the constitution it must 
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be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime. Similarly, for an arrest to be lawful it must be supported by 
probable cause that an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
In addition, the plain language of the interference statute codified at Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-8-305 makes no reference to "a scope of authority" standard such as that 
adopted by the Court of Appeals in its interpretation of the statute. 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 
11. 
Pena-Flores asserts that interference with unconstitutional and unlawful seizures by 
police cannot be justified under any pretense that such acts fall within the scope of 
authority; and that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statutes "seeking to effect" 
language as dileneated in its "scope of authority" standard completely reads out of the 
statute's plain language the requirement that the arrest or detention be lawful. 
Accordingly, Pena-Flores asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-8-305 is contrary to the statute's plain language and should be corrected 
by this Court. 
B. The Court of Appeals interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 
misconstrues the Legislature's intent in amending the statute following this 
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw. 
Even should this Court conclude that the term "lawful" is ambiguous, the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation (and its scope of authority test) is not supported by the legislative 
history of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 as it is currently codified. 
In 1981, the legislature amended the interference statute in response to this Court's 
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). In Bradshaw, this Court 
concluded that the previous version of the interfering statute was unconstitutionally vague. 
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541 P.2d at 801, 802-805. The statute as it then existed read: "A person is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes with a person recognized to be a law 
enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself or another 
regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest." In other words, at the time it 
did not matter if the detention or arrest was lawful. All that was required for conviction 
was that law enforcement officers be "seeking to effect an arrest or detention." In 
Bradshaw, both a two-judge plurality and a concurring justice found the statute 
unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "regardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest" could have any number of interpretations and because the statute could 
"penalize a law-abiding citizen by incarceration because he did not willingly submit to an 
unlawful arrest." 541 P.2d at 801, 802-805. 
The 1981 amendment to the interference statute-which is the statute at issue-
makes it a crime to interfere with police officers who are "seeking to effect a lawful arrest 
or detention." 1981 Utah Laws, ch. 62, § 1. During the floor debates in the House of 
Representatives, the bill's sponsor, Representative Harrison, detailed this Court's decision 
in Bradshaw as the impetus for amending the statute. Floor Debate, 42nd Utah Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (January 19, 1981) (House Recording no. 3, side A). See, Addenda. Harrison 
explained to the House that a statewide body of prosecutor's had drafted the amendment 
"to require a lawful arrest" as a condition to the crime of interference. Id. Moreover, in 
response to a question, Harrison defined "an unlawful arrest" as one made by police 
without "reasonable grounds or cause to do so without probable cause." Id. In addition, 
when another representative expressed concern that the term "lawful" could be vague, 
Representative Harrison indicated that court decisions had defined-and would defme-the 
lawfulness of arrests (or detentions). Id. 
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Pena-Flores asserts that the legislative history confirms that the Utah Legislature 
only intended to criminalize interference to arrests or detentions when the police have 
"reasonable grounds... or probable cause." Furthermore, the legislature was aware of the 
concerns expressed by this Court in Bradshaw and accordingly included in Utah Code 
Annotated 
§ 76-8-305 the requirement that police have an underlying "lawful" basis for arresting or 
detaining persons. 
Accordingly, Pena-Flores requests that this Court correct the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that "the use of 'lawful' in section 76-8-305 does not automatically 
incorporate" the requirement that the interference be with a level-two detention or level-
three arrest. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at Tf 11. 
C. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 is not 
in accordance with this Court's decision in State v. Gardner. 
In adopting its "scope of authority" test, the Court of Appeals indicated that this 
interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 is similar to that adopted by this Court 
in State v. Gardner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), and by the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Griego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1997). American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT 
App 323 at f^ 12. Pena-Flores respectfully asserts that the Court of Appeals' reliance on 
Gardner and Griego is misplaced. 
First, at issue in Gardner was an interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
102.4 (1990)-which concerns the crime of assaulting a police officer-and the right of an 
individual to forcefully resist an illegal search. In this case, Pena-Flores did not 
demonstrate any force in his interference or resistence. Moreover, all references made by 
this Court in Gardner to police acting within the scope of his or her authority arise from 
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the plain language of § 76-5-102.4 which reads: "Any person who assaults a peace officer, 
with knowledge that he is a police officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the 
scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor" (emphasis 
added). Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 does not contain such language but requires that 
the officers be seeking to effect a lawful detention or arrest. 
Second, this Court convicted Gardner of interference with an officer under § 76-8-
305 not because he resisted the officers' warrantless, illegal entry into the building but 
because he interfered with the officers' attempts to place him under arrest after he had 
committed the crime of assault on a police officer by punching the officer in the face 
again. Gardner, 814 P.2d at 575. Similarly, in Griego, the defendant hit and kicked 
several officers after they entered his home and seized him without a warrant. 933 P.2d at 
1006. Moreover, Griego resisted so loudly the seizure that several neighbors exited their 
homes to investigate the ruckus. 933 P.2d at 1008. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 
police had lawfully arrested Griego for interference because he had violated the disorderly 
conduct statute when he disturbed is neighbors "well before he was arrested." Griego, 
933 P.2d at 1008. Accordingly, both Gardner and Griego present cases where the police 
had a lawful basis to arrest the defendant prior to the interference; and therefore, neither 
decision had construes the language of the interference statute. In this case, however, 
there were no intervening illegal acts either by Pena-Flores or the "gang" members which 
would cure the taint of the officers' actions in seizing the gang members without 
reasonable suspicion and which would create a lawful arrest or detention against which 
Pena-Flores interfered. 
Accordingly, Pena-Flores requests that this Court conclude that the Court of 
Appeals' reliance on Gardner and Griego is misplaced and that the "scope of authority" 
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standard adopted by the Court of Appeals is inapplicable to Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-
305. 
D. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 
violates the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
Pena-Flores asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-8-305 violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution because unconstitutional and unlawful seizures 
by police cannot be justified under any pretense that such acts fall within the scope of 
authority. In addition, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded... 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
law." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citation omitted). 
While the previous version of the interference statute—which did not require a legal 
basis for the arrest or detention-was struck down on vagueness grounds, this Court in 
Gardner noted that the Bradshaw majority concluded in dictum that: 
If the intention of the legislature was to penalize a law-abiding citizen by 
incarceration because he [or she] did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a 
statute authorizing the same is in violation of both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions... in that it permits and authorizes an arrest without probable cause 
and without lawful basis for the arrest. 
Gardner, 814 P.2d at 571 (quoting Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 801). Pena-Flores asserts that a 
statute which punishes a citizen for pointing out that police are effecting an unlawful 
detention is likewise unconstitutional because it permits and authorizes the sei2^ire of 
14 
citizens without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and without lawful basis for the 
detention. Pena-Flores further asserts that the "scope of authority" test invented by the 
Court of Appeals in this case creates just such a statute and is therefore, unconstitutional. 
Moreover, due process demands that "one cannot be punished for failing to obey 
the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution." Wright 
v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963). Likewise, due process demands that one not be 
punished for simply informing individuals that an officer's command is unlawful and 
unconstitutional. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that "whether the police had 
reasonable suspicion to justify" the detention of the gang members "is immaterial to 
defendant's conviction" because the officers' were acting within the scope of their 
authority and the detention had the indicia of being lawful—the officers were in uniform, 
acting as police officers and were conducting police business. American Fork City v. 
Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 16, 17. Therefore, the officers were "seeking to 
effect" a lawful detention. 2000 UT App 323 at % 16. However, this interpretation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 and the Court of Appeals' misplaced emphasis on the 
terms "seeking to effect" effectively gives police discretion as to whether the Fourth 
Amendment protections are applicable to any given situation. Moreover, it effectively 
reads the "lawfulness" requirement out of the statute by protecting all police conduct that 
is accomplished while acting in an official capacity. 
Pena-Flores asserts that any interpretation of a statute which allows the punishment 
of a law-abiding citizen because he did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest~or 
because he simply pointed out that police are effecting an unlawful detention—violates 
both the United States and Utah Constitutions because it permits and authorizes the 
15 
seizure and/or arrest of citizens without reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal 
activity and without lawful basis for the detention or arrest. Pena-Flores asserts that the 
Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 creates just such an 
unconstitutional statute and that this interpretation must be corrected by this Court. 
E. The police detention of the gang members was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 
Pena-Flores asserts that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, whether the 
police had reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of the gang members is not only 
material to the issue of his conviction but is dispositive. See, American Fork City v. Pena-
Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 17. As discussed supra for Pena-Flores to be properly 
convicted of interference with a peace officer, his interference or impedance must be in a 
situation where the police were seeking to effect a lawful arrest (supported by probable 
cause) or detention (supported by reasonable suspicion). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the encounter between 
the police and the gang members was a level-two encounter which required reasonable 
suspicion to be legal. In other words, to properly detain individuals the officers must be 
able to "point to specific, articulable facts, which together with rational inferences drawn 
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude" that a crime had been 
committed or was about to be committed. State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah 
App. 1997). See also, State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
Pena-Flores asserts that the specific set of facts which are present here concerning 
the detention of the gang members do not give rise to "reasonable suspicion" and 
therefore, Pena-Flores' conviction must be reversed because he did not interfere with—or 
impede—the police seeking to effect a lawful detention. Officer Leavitt admitted that 
16 
neither he nor the other ten officers that were involved in the detention of the gang 
members had observed any illegal activity (R. 32 at 23). The officers were present at the 
carnival in case any fights broke out and because they had received information that there 
"might be a problem" (R. 32 at 4-5, 24). However, at the time of the detention no such 
problem had arisen. 
Moreover, Officer Leavitt could point to no specific, articulable facts that any of 
the individuals detained were actually involved in the fight that had occurred either on the 
previous night or the previous week. In fact, Leavitt's testimony establishes only that the 
officers were planning to I.D. a interview "all of the people who were hanging out with 
known gang members, who through association could have been" at a fight the previous 
night at the carnival or a fight the previous week in Pleasant Grove (R. 32 at 11-12). 
Pena-Flores asserts that "could have been" involved in illegal activity is insufficient to 
establish that any of the detained individuals "had committed or was about to commit a 
crime." Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228. 
Accordingly, because the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to 
detain the gang members, Pena-Flores asserts that his conviction for interference must be 
reversed because he did not interfere with~or impede-officers seeking to effect a lawful 
detention. 
17 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Pena-Flora asks that this Court reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and his conviction for interference with a peace officer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Zr day of October, 2001. 
Margaret FT Lindsay 
Counsel for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this^Tday of October, 2001. 
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2000 IT Aop 323 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
person has committed or is about r,j 
a crime. ^ 
v. 
Luis PENA-FLORES, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 990901-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 16, 2000. 
Defendant was convicted, after a ber)c^ 
trial in the District Court, American 
F ork 
Department. Howard H. Maetani, J., of *n" 
terference with a peace officer. Defend£nt 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwo^, 
P.J., held that: (1) the encounter between 
police officers and gang members was a de' 
tendon: (2) the detention did not have to ®e 
lawful, for purposes of interference with a 
peace officer, as long as the officers w£re 
acting \\Vitim t'ne scope oi t\ie\r authority -a1™ 
the detention had the indicia of being law^u*> 
(3) the detention of the gang members frac* 
indicia of being lawful. 
Affirmed. 
5. Arrest C=>6$< 4) 
The difference between
 a tur^r-s^ 
counter and a detention i.s wr.etner. : ar»j^ 
a show of physical force or authors.
 a ^ 
son believes his freedom of mo\eme»fc 
restrained. 
"% 
1. Criminal Law «3=>1158(1) 
In determining whether the police en~ 
counter was a detention, the appellate cou r t 
would review the trial court's factual findi*1^ 
under a clearly erroneous standard, #n" 
would review its conclusions based on t n e 
totality of those facts, for correctness. 
2. Criminal Law e=>l 134(3) 
A question of statutory interpretat10n 
presents a question of law, which is revie^*ec* 
for correctness. 
a. Criminal Law <3»1224(tt 
In a consensual encounter, an of#cer 
may approach a citizen at any time and p o s e 
questions, so long as the citizen is not de-
tained against his will. 
4. Arrest o=»63.5(4) 
An officer may seize a person if t n e 
officer ha& an articulable suspicion that ^ e 
6. Arrest <S>68(4) 
The determination of whether a 
is detained focuses on whether the per^ 
remained, not in the spirit of cooperate 
with the officer's investigation, but bee** 
he believed he was not free to lea\ e 
7. Arrest <3=>68(4) 
Encounter between police and g*» 
members at carnival was a "detention,* 
where police were interviewing and phot* 
graphing, for purposes of investigate 
known gang members behe\ ed to ha\ e beet 
involved in a fight the previous night, tat 
police were physically escoiting the mdmd* 
als from the back of the carnival to the fro* 
of the carnival. 
See publication Wordb and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
8. Obstructing Justice c=7 
Although police must have reasonabk 
suspicion in order to make a legal detentkl 
the use of 'lawful/' in statute defining i 
ference with a peace officer as including »• 
terference when a "peace officer ^ seeking* 
effect a lawful arrest or detention of thtf 
person or another," does not automatical 
incorporate the reasonable suspicion sb£ 
dard; rather, so long as the peace officer 1 
acting within the scope of his or her authdfr 
ty and the detention or arre.-t has the indkt 
of being lawful, a person can be guilty* 
interfering with a Deace officer, even ***•:? 
the arrest or detention is later determined» 
be unlawful. U.C.A.1953, 7»>-S-305(3), 
9. Statutes 0181(1), 184 
When* construing a statute, the coarf»>; 
primary purpose is to gi\ e effect to the ** 
tent of the Legislature, m light of the f* 
pose the statute was meant to achie\e. 
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tesO^lSS, 212.6 
r~e court presumes that the Legislature 
\i,-r :errri :r. the statute advisedly, and 
erreet to each term according to its 
^ -ury and accepted meaning. 
• t Obstructing Justice e=>7 
Poiice officers' detention of gang mem-
had indicia of being lawful, as element 
./*:erference with a peace officer, even if 
oncers lacked reasonable suspicion for 
_ Mentions, where officers were wearing 
^ v marked police uniforms and were in-
•^•uting known gang members and people 
s^-xuting with the gang members to gather 
f^ormation about two previous fights that 
vjj recently occurred. U.C.A.1953, 76-S-
Mirraret P. Lindsay, Aldrich, Neson, 
W«*ht & Esplin. Provo, for Appellant. 
Jjnio Tucker Hansen and Bruce Mur-
jx-k, Duval Hansen Witt & Moreley LLC, 
Laerican Fork, for Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENCH, 
•ad BILLINGS. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD. Presiding Judge: 
11 Defendant appeals his conviction of 
laterference with a Peace Officer in violation 
* Utah Code Ann. <j 76-8-305, arguing that 
»r«?r*nn cannot interfere unless an officer is 
**k^g to make a lawful arrest or detention. 
tWcndant argues that either the gang mem-
fcrs were not detained or, in the alternative, 
* they were detained, the detention was not 
**fal. Thus, defendant claims under either 
theory that he was not interfering with a 
**ful arrest or detention as required by the 
**«*. We affirm. 
BACKGROUNDl 
1
- On July 10, 1999, members of the Pro-
^ty Police Department were present in 
^erican Fork to help patroj the Steel Days 
T^'al. Based on information received 
^ street contacts and anonymous tips, 
e
 relevant facts of this ca*e are not in dis-
Citeas 14 P.3d 698 (Ltah App. 2000) 
police believed there was a possibility of 
gang activity. Additionally, police were 
aware of gang fights the previous night and a 
week earlier between an American Fork 
gang and a Payson gang. Based on reports, 
police believed that the Payson gang might 
be coming to American Fork to retaliate for 
the fight that occurred a week earlier. 
11 3 During the carnival, officers dressed in 
clearly marked police uniforms observed 
known gang members congregating in the 
back corner of the carnival. Having identi-
fied the gang members, the officers proceed-
ed to interview them and fill out interview 
cards for their files. Duiing this process, 
police targeted certain individuals, whom 
they identified by tattoos and monikers, and 
escorted them to the front of the carnival, 
where the officers filled out interview cards 
and photographed them. 
U 4 While poiice were interviewing the 
gang members, defendant, who was associat-
ing with them, but who was not known to 
police, told his friends that they did not have 
to talk with police or allow the police to take 
their pictures. The poiice officers told defen-
dant to shut his mouth and step back from 
the situation. Defendant, however, persisted 
in telling his friends that they did not have to 
cooperate. At this point Officer Leavitt told 
defendant he had become "part of the party" 
and instructed him to come up to the front to 
be interviewed. Once defendant was taken 
to the front. Officer Leavitt asked him for 
some identification. Defendant told Officer 
Leavitt that he did not have to show him his 
identification. Officer Leavitt asked defen-
dant if he had any identification with him. 
Defendant responded that he had some in his 
pocket. Officer Leavitt told defendant to 
show him the identification, but defendant 
refused. Officer Leavitt told defendant he 
was under arrest for failure to provide infor-
mation to a police officer, handcuffed him, 
and removed the identification. After a 
bench trial, defendant was convicted of inter-
fering with a peace officer. Defendant now 
appeals his conviction. 
pute. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1,2] *l 5 This case presents two ques-
tions: (1) Was the police encounter with 
gang members a detention, and (2) does 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 require a lawful 
arrest or detention in order for a defendant 
to be charged with interfering with an offi-
cer? In determining whether the encounter 
was a detention, we review the trial court's 
factual findings under a clearly erroneous 
standard and its "conclusions based on the 
totality of those facts for correctness." State 
v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct.App. 
1997). A question of statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. See State v. Widdison 2000 
UT App 1S5, H 16, 4 P.3d 100; State v. Wes-
terman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct.App. 
1997). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Was the Encounter a Level-Two De-
tention 
H 6 Defendant argues that the encounter 
between police and gang members was mere-
ly a consensual level-one encounter, and thus 
he cannot be convicted of interfering with a 
peace officer because the statute requires 
either a level-two detention or a level-three 
arrest. Section 76-8-305 states: 
A person is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of 
that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by . . . the arrested 
person's or another person's refusal to re-
frain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(3) (1999) (em-
phasis added). 
[3-6] H 7 Defendant argues that police 
were merely gathering information from the 
gang members, and thus the encounter was a 
consensual level-one encounter. In a consen-
sual level-one encounter, " ' "an officer may 
approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not de-
tained against his will." ' " State v. Struhs, 
940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (cita-
tions omitted). In a level-two encon^ 
an officer may seize a person if the oft? 
has an 'articulable suspicion' that the iw* 
has committed or is about to coning 
crime. Id. (citations omitted). The* 
fere nee between a consensual level-one 
counter and a level-two detention is \vh*^ 
"'through a show of physical force or autW 
ty, a person believes his freedom of Q ^ 
ment is restrained." Id. Furthermore, % 
determination of whether a person is 4 
tained focuses on u 'whether defendant % 
mainfed], not in the spirit of cooperation^ 
the officer's investigation, but because fc 
believfed] he [was] not free to leave.'*'" JJ 
(citations omitted). 
[7] 118 In this case, the facts indicate 4i 
the police interview of the gang merabei 
was a level-two detention. Specifically, at 
only were police interviewing and phefc. 
graphing known gang members believed | 
have been involved in a fight the previa* 
night, but also police were physically esoiv 
ing these individuals from the back of lb 
carnival to the front of the carnival. Offio* 
Leavitt testified that the officers had fc 
tained the gang members for purposes of tit 
investigation. Based on the facts and OflSoar 
Leavitt's testimony, we cannot say the trif 
court's conclusion that police had detamrf 
the gang members was clearly erroneoa 
119 The State argues that the "seeking * 
effect" statutorv language shows the Legifc 
ture intended the statute to cover a bro» 
range of encounters than only detentions a* 
arrests. However, because we conclude th* 
the police did detain the gang members,* 
decline to address whether a person couWh 
lawfully arrested for interfering with a le*» 
one encounter. 
II. Does Section 76-8-305 Require 
Lawful Detention 
H 10 Next, defendant argues that the <• 
tention of the gang members was not S? 
ported by reasonable suspicion, and thus* 
conviction must be reversed because the st* 
ute requires a ''lawful arrest or detenu** 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). As* 
fendant points out: "In order to J u S ®. 
seizure, a police officer must 'point to spe»* 
Sfjcuiable tact* 
c
 • — drawn from those facts, 
... Tn,l:'' 
:r.:ere 
which, together with ra-
nees 
eiiii a reasonable person to conclude 
iuntj had committed or was about 
a crime/" State v. Struhs, 940 
y e in on: 
:225. l-- s ^U t a h Ct.App.1997) (altera-
rlnai) (citation omitted). 
vote 
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Cite as 14 P.3d 698 (UtahApp. 2000) 
fl 13 Although Gardiner and Griego could 
be distinguished on the ground that both 
involved a prior illegal police act which was 
superseded by a lawful arrest that formed 
the basis of the interference charge, such a 
distinction is against the clear weight of au-
thority and the language in the statute. Oth-
er states that have examined this issue have 
consistently determined that illegal police 
conduct does not justify a defendant interfer-
ing with a detention or arrest. See, e.g., 
Jurco v. State, $25 P.2d 909, 911, 914 (Alaska 
Ct.App.1992) (defendant could not resist ar-
rest even though disorderly conduct charge 
was invalid); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 
74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33, 36-37 (1969) 
(duty to refrain from resisting unlawful ar-
rest does not violate Fourth Amendment pro-
hibition against unreasonable seizures); Kes-
sler v. Barowsky. 129 Idaho 647, 931 P.2d 
641, 650 (1997) (person cannot resist arrest if 
he knows he is being arrested by a police 
officer); State v. Logan, 8 Kan.App.2d 232, 
654 P.2d 492, 495 (19S2) (person cannot resist 
arrest by law enforcement even if he believes 
arrest is unlawful); State v. Laughlin, 281 
Mont. 179, 933 P.2d 813, 814-15 (1997) 
(same); Fug ere v. State, Taxation and Reve-
nue Dep'L Motor Vehicle Dm, 120 N.M. 29, 
897 P.2d 216, 223 (N.M.Ct.App.1995) (legal 
challenge to unlawful arrest can be raised 
after the arrest, rather than by resisting 
arrest); State v. Castle, 48 OrApp. 15, 616 
P.2d 510, 512 (1980) (generally person cannot 
resist arrest even when person know? he is 
innocent); State v. Mather, 28 WashApp. 
700, 626 P.2d 44. 47 (1981) (right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure does 
not create right to react unreasonably to an 
illegal detention). 
U 14 As the Wyoming Supreme Court not-
ed; "The legislative intent to prohibit that 
which would interfere with law enforcement 
officers as they go about their duties is mani-
fest. A person of common intelligence need 
not guess at the meaning and intended appli-
cation of the statute." Newton v. State, 698 
*P.2d 1149, 1152 (Wyo.1985). We believe that 
it is equally clear that our Legislature, by 
enacting section 76-8-305, intended to pro-
tect law enforcement officers who seek to 
discharge their official duties. 
ui * 11 Although police must have rea-
cible suspicion in order to make a legal 
fr*jfr.t:on. the use of "lawful" in section 76-8-
%6 i<^ n o t automatically incorporate this 
• •-iiard in determining whether a person is 
, j v ,)f interfering with a peace officer. So 
ri & a police officer is acting within the 
x-xe of his or her authority and the deten-
v-r. T arrest has the indicia of being lawful, 
i yrrs-on can be guilty of interfering with a 
-• i.-e officer even when the arrest or deten-
•j.r. is later determined to be unlawful. As 
** wiir: discussed; "The determination of 
*v.her an airest is lawful is often difficult 
•..: should not be left to bystanders who may 
uve only a limited knowledge of the relevant 
JT and who may let their emotions control 
•Jfcr judgment." State v. Holeman, 103 
W*h2d 426. 693 P.2d 89, 92 (1985). 
112 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme 
Cant has adopted a similar rule. In State v. 
'>.niir.€r. 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), defen-
iir.t was convicted of both assaulting a police 
suiter and interfering with an arrest. In 
case, defendant claimed that the officer 
%
-*i illegally entered a private building to 
^•^'^ate suspected criminal activity. See 
*i at 575. Defendant claimed his initial 
**ault against the officer when the officer 
«*ered the building and resistance after be-
** informed that he was under arrest were 
;^ti!:ed because the underlying search by 
-
1
* officer was illegal. See id. The supreme 
^ rejected this argument, stating; "The 
p 1 that his attempted search was later 
•'*nd to be unlawful does not divest [the 
';-**r] of his authority." Id. Similarly, in 
Gnego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah CtApp. 
we assumed that "the police officers' 
^""antless entry into defendant's home and 
** seizure were illegal." Id. at 1008. De-
**•* this illegality, we upheld defendant's 
m -TOon lor interfering with an officer. 
N f
 'd. at 1Q09. 
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[9,10] 1 15 "When construing a statute, 
our primary purpose is to give effect to the 
intent of the Legislature in light of the pur-
pose the statute was meant to achieve." 
State c. Widdison. 2000 UT App 185, H 21, 4 
P.3d 100 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). Additionally. " 'we presume that 
the Legislature used each term advisedly, 
and we give effect to each term according to 
its ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
1116 Defendant's argument that the statute 
requires a lawful arrest or detention reads 
out of the statute the phrase "seeking to 
effect." Given our prior case law and the 
Legislature's inclusion of the "seeking to ef-
fect" language, we believe that the statute is 
intended to protect law enforcement officers 
who are either making a lawful detention or 
arrest, or who are seeking to effect a lawful 
detention or arrest. An officer can seek to 
effect a lawful arrest or detention when he or 
she is acting within the scope of his or her 
authority and the detention or arrest has the 
indicia of being lawful. 
[11] 1117 In this case, the police officers 
were wearing clearly marked police uniforms 
and were investigating known gang members 
and people associating with these gang mem-
bers to gather information about two previ-
ous fights that had recently occurred. Addi-
tionally, the police officers had information 
that one gang might be attempting to retali-
ate against another gang for one of the previ-
ous fights. To this end, police officers briefly 
detained these individuals to gather informa-
tion and update their tiles. Whether the 
police had reasonable suspicion to justify this 
detention is immaterial to defendant's convic-
tion, because defendant was in no position to 
determine on his own whether the officers' 
actions were lawful. 
CONCLUSION 
U 18 Based on the evidence presented, the 
trial court correctly determined that police 
had seized the gang members at the carnival. 
Furthermore, the police wore uniforms which 
clearly identified them as law enforcement 
officers and they were acting in a manner 
that had all the indicia of a lawful police 
detention. Therefore, defendant's interfer-
e s 
ence with the police investigation 
cient to support a conviction under 
76-8-305(3). Accordingly, we afrlrrn 
dant's conviction. 
11 19 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL ',Y 
BENCH, Judge, JUDITH M. BILLING^ 
Judge. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
2000 UT App 333 
Daniel D. PRICE, Susanne Q. Price, fee* 
Swensen, Kay Swensen, Ross LamA^ 
and Carma Larrabee, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSEXGB 
CORPORATION; Southern Padfc 
Transportation Company, a Delanw* 
corporation; and South Jordan Crtr, * 
Utah municipal corporation, Defen 
and Appellees. 
No. 990554-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 24, 2000. 
Parents of driver and passengers A> 
were killed in collision between trxn vi 
vehicle brought wrongful death *^** 
against railroads and city. The Third Di$3*$. 
Salt Lake Department, Anne M. Surbt, L 
granted defendants' motions for suxaotff 
judgment, and parents appealed. The 0«* 
of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) n* 
roads had no duty to upgrade warning ** 
vices at crossing where collision occurred* 
to urge Department of Transportation (DW 
to do so, even if crossing was more xm 
ordinarily hazardous; (2) parents' exce*** 
speed tort claim against railroads 
preempted by National Railroad Safety ^ 
(NRSA); (3) train operator's duty*to W 1 
did not arise, as a matter of law, until « ^ 
dents' car drove onto railroad tracss 
there was no genuine issue of material a*1 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Chad A. GARDINER, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 890231. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 18, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted, in the 
Eighth Circuit Court, Uintah County, A. 
Lynn Payne, J., of assaulting a peace offi-
cer and interfering with a peace officer. 
He appealed. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed and denied petition for rehearing. 
The Supreme Court granted defendant's 
writ of certiorari, and Zimmerman, J., held 
that defendant was not justified in forcibly 
resisting police officer's attempt to search 
business premises, even though search was 
later determined to be illegal. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, filed 
dissenting opinion in which Stewart, J., 
joined. 
1. Courts <s=>103 
Opinion that established new rule of 
Utah law and opinion that dealt with dicta 
in another case which appeared to be flatly 
contrary to new rule of law should have 
been published. Rules App.Proc, Rule 31. 
2. Searches and Seizures <S=>24 
Absent one of narrow category of exi-
gent circumstances, warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable under Fourth 
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Courts <s=>92 
Supreme Court was not bound by earli-
er dicta. 
4. Constitutional Law <s=*70.1(10) 
Supreme Court was not free to reject 
English common-law right to forcibly resist 
illegal arrest because legislature had al-
ready acted in that area by abolishing all 
common-law crimes and codifying crimes 
and defenses. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-105. 
5. Assault and Battery e=>63 
Where police officer who attempted to 
search business did not act wholly outside 
scope of his authority, defendant could not 
forcibly resist officer and, thus, defendant 
was properly convicted of assaulting peace 
officer, for punching officer after officer 
pushed him and after officer told him he 
was under arrest, even though officer's 
attempted search was illegal. U.C.A.1953, 
76-S-102.4. 
6. Criminal Law ^260.11(2, 4) 
In cases involving mixed questions of 
fact and law where judge makes determina-
tion on contested facts, Supreme Court 
views evidence in light most favorable to 
trial court's ruling and reverses only if 
necessary factual findings implicit in 
court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary 
support. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
7. Obstructing Justice e=»3, 8 
Defendant who punched police officer 
and fought with him after officer informed 
defendant that he was under arrest was 
properly convicted of interfering with 
peace officer, and fact that officer's under-
lying search was illegal did not justify at-
tack on officer. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-305. 
8. Obstructing Justice <s=>7 
Statute giving individual right to use 
reasonable force to prevent or terminate 
unlawful entry into or attack upon his hab-
itation did not apply in case in which defen-
dant forcibly resisted police officer who 
attempted to search place of business. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-2-405. 
9. Obstructing Justice <3=7 
Neither statute giving individual right 
to use force to prevent or terminate crimi-
nal interference with real property nor 
statute giving individual right to use rea-
sonable force to prevent or terminate un-
lawful entry into or attack upon his hab-
itation were intended to include right to use 
force against peace officers acting in 
course of their duties. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-
405, 76-2-406. 
?:. Paul Van Dam. David B 
Sal: Lake City, for State of Utah. 
Harry* H. Souvall, Vernal, for Gardiner. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Chad Gardiner appeals from a 
conviction of assaulting a peace officer un-
der section 76-5-102.4 of the Code and a 
conviction of interfering with a peace offi-
cer under section 76-8-305 of the Code. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.4, 76-8-305 
(1990). These convictions arose out of an 
incident in which Gardiner refused to per-
mit an officer to conduct a search of the 
premises where a party was in progress. 
Gardiner claims that he had a right to 
forcibly resist the officer's illegal search 
and the ensuing arrest. 
Gardiner's claims on appeal are several. 
First, he argues that he had a right to 
resist because in State v. Bradshaw, 541 
P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), this court recognized 
a citizen's common law right to forcibly 
resist an illegal arrest by a peace officer. 
Second, he asserts that he could not be 
guilty of violating section 76-5-102.4 be-
cause it only bars the assaulting of a peace 
officer acting within the scope of his or her 
authority. He contends that the officer's 
entry into the building was illegal and, 
therefore, the officer was not acting within 
the scope of his authority. Finally, he con-
tends that section 76-2-406 of the Code, a 
statute permitting the use of force to de-
fend property, gave him the right to resist 
the officer's search of his property. We 
disagree with all of Gardiner's contentions 
and uphold his convictions. 
We recite the facts in a light most favor-
able to the State, the prevailing party be-
low. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 
(Utah 1989); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530, 531 (Utah 1979); Paull v. Zions First 
Xat'l Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 184, 417 P.2d 
"59, 760 (1966). 
During the early morning hours of-April 
17, 1988, the Uintah County Sheriffs De-
partment received an anonymous complaint 
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Thompson, that a loud party was in progress at the 
Vernal City Airport and that minors were 
consuming alcohol at that party. At ap-
proximately 3 a.m., Deputy Jim Lytle was 
dispatched to the airport to investigate the 
complaint. Vernal City Officer Steve Hat-
zidakis and Reserve Officer Terry Shiner 
responded to assist Deputy Lytle in his 
investigation. 
The officers located a party at the Dina-
land Aviation building. While Officer Hat-
zidakis was talking to individuals in a ve-
hicle near the building, he noticed that 
someone was attempting to close a sliding 
door on the building. Officer Hatzidakis 
went to the doorway. There, he smelled a 
strong odor of alcohol and saw several 
people within the building whom he be-
lieved to be minors. He announced his 
intention to enter the building to check for 
the presence of minors. 
At that point, defendant Chad Gardiner, 
who was in the building, stepped forward 
and stated that his father owned the build-
ing. Gardiner asked the officer for a 
search warrant. Upon being told that the 
officer had no warrant, Gardiner said that 
Officer Hatzidakis could not enter, stepped 
within eight to ten inches of the officer at 
the doorway, and extended his arm, to the 
side to block the door and prevent the 
officer from entering. Officer Hatzidakis 
pushed Gardiner, who then fell backward 
onto a table, which collapsed under him. 
Gardiner got up, rushed toward Officer 
Hatzidakis, and punched him in the face. 
The blow knocked the officer out of the 
building. Outside the building, a struggle 
ensued between Gardiner and the three 
officers. After being informed by Officer 
Hatzidakis that he was under arrest, Gard-
iner did not stop fighting but again 
punched the officer in the face. Gardiner 
was ultimately subdued and taken to jail. 
Gardiner was charged with two counts of 
assaulting a peace officer, one count of 
interfering with a peace officer, and one 
count of intoxication in a private place. 
The case was heard without a jury by 
Judge A. Lynn Payne of the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Uintah County. Judge Payne 
found Gardiner guilty of one count of as-
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saulting a peace officer and one count of 
interfering with a peace officer. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.4. 76-8-305 (1990). 
Gardiner was fined S500 and given a one-
year suspended sentence. 
Gardiner appealed his convictions. In an 
unpublished opinion, the Utah Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the search by Officer Hat-
zidakis was illegal because there were no 
exigent circumstances that justified a war-
rantless search. However, the court went 
on to say that the legality of the search 
was not the pivotal issue. Rather, the de-
ciding issue was whether a citizen has the 
right to forcibly resist a peaceful search by 
an officer when that search is at some later 
date determined to be illegal. The court 
followed a decision from Alaska, Elson v. 
State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983), and 
declined to recognize the English common 
law rule that a citizen does have such a 
right. Instead, the court of appeals held 
that one may not resist a search by an 
officer, even if illegal, * 'unless [the] defen-
dant can show that the officer was not . . . 
acting pursuant to his [or her] authority, or 
had used excessive force." State v. Gard-
iner, No. 880557 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Be-
cause defendant had not carried his burden 
on these issues, the court affirmed his con-
viction for assaulting a peace officer. 
[1] Gardiner then petitioned for a re-
hearing, arguing that the court of appeals' 
holding was in conflict with this court's 
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 
(Utah 1975). In Bradshaw, this court held 
1. We note with some concern the court of ap-
peals' use of rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure to dispose of this case via an 
unpublished opinion, even after Bradshaw was 
called to its attention. Rule 31 allows an appel-
late court to "dispose of any qualified case" in 
an unpublished opinion upon its own motion. 
However, by its own terms, the rule is not 
appropriate for use where there are "substantial 
constitutional issues, issues of significant public 
interest, issues of law of first impression, or 
complicated issues of fact or law." Utah 
R.App.P. 31. 
Here, the initial court of appeals' opinion* es-
tablished a new rule of Utah law, as the opinion 
itself acknowledged; yet that opinion was un-
published. Then the court of appeals denied 
Gardiner's petition for rehearing, which brought 
to the court's attention dicta in Bradshaw that 
appeared to be flatly contrary to the new rule 
that a Utah statute making it unlawful f0 
a citizen to forcibly resist an illegal arrest 
was written so as to make it unconstitu-
tionally vague. Bradshaw went on to sav 
in dicta that if the legislature, in passing 
the statute in question, had intended to 
punish a citizen who refused to "willingly 
submit to an unlawful arrest," then the 
statute would also violate both the state 
and federal constitutions. Id. at 801. This 
dicta, claimed Gardiner, plainly recognized 
the English common law right to resist an 
unlawful arrest; indeed, it constitutional-
ized it. Because an illegal search is direct-
ly analogous to an illegal arrest, Gardiner 
argued, Bradshaw governed the present 
case and the court of appeals' holding was 
in direct conflict with Bradshaw. The 
court of appeals denied Gardiner's petition 
without comment.1 This court then grant-
ed Gardiner's writ of certiorari. 
In passing on Gardiner's claims, we first 
note that the court of appeals affirmed his 
conviction for assaulting a peace officer 
under section 76-5-102.4 of the Code, but 
did not mention his conviction for interfer-
ing with a peace officer under section 76-
8-305 of the Code. Our review of Gard-
iner's brief in the court of appeals makes it 
clear that he appealed from both convic-
tions and that his challenges to both were 
virtually identical. Therefore, we presume 
that the court of appeals intended its ruling 
to apply to both convictions. We will ad-
dress both convictions in our opinion. 
announced in the unpublished opinion; yet the 
opinion remained unpublished. In sum, this 
case rather plainly was not one that could be 
properly disposed of under rule 31. 
The evils of unpublished opinions have been 
commented upon by many. Given the paucity 
of precedent in Utah, there seems little justifica-
tion for their use here. "[I]f a case deserves 
being disposed of by written opinion, that opin-
ion should be published. If a decision truly 
adds nothing to the law, it should be disposed of 
from the bench or by a short written order that 
may be informative to the parties but to no one 
else." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 
*1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). For a dis-
cussion of the potential problems associated 
with unpublished opinions see Reuben, Publish-
ed in Part, Buried in Part, 16 Li tig. 4 (Summer 
1990), and Raffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 
(Utah 1986). 
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[2] We also note our acceptance of the 
court of appeals' conclusion that Officer 
Hatzidakis's search of the building was il-
Vo-al This court has held that absent one 
of a narrow category of exigent circum-
stances, warrantless searches are "per se 
unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987); see also State v. Christensen, 
676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). That princi-
ple has as much, if not more, force under 
the Utah Constitution. See State v. Laroc-
c0, 794 P.2d 460, 466-68 (Utah 1990). 
Therefore, this case squarely presents the 
question of whether Gardiner had a com-
mon law or statutory right to resist what 
was later determined to be an illegal 
search. Gardiner makes three separate ar-
guments attacking his convictions, but all 
are really variations on a theme. 
[3] Gardiner's first contention is that 
our decision in Bradshaw adopted the Eng-
lish common law rule that a person can 
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest and, 
therefore, that he had the right to forcibly 
resist Officer Hatzidakis's search of Dina-
land Aviation. Response to this argument 
requires a rather detailed discussion of 
Bradshaw. 
The defendant in Bradshaw was charged 
with resisting arrest in violation of what 
was then section 76-8-305 of the Code. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 
1973). That statute read: "A person is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor when he 
[or she] intentionally interferes with a per-
son recognized to be a law enforcement 
official seeking to effect an arrest or deten-
tion of himself [or herself] or another re-
gardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest." Id. The defendant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute, 
claiming that it violated the search and 
seizure clause of the Utah Constitution. 
See Utah Const, art. I, § 14. Although the 
opinion is not clear on this point, he appar-
ently claimed that an illegal arrest amount-
ed to an unreasonable seizure. 
The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Tuckett, joined by Justice Maughan, and 
separately concurred in by Justice Henriod, 
aid not dispose of the case on the defen-
dant's contention, but instead struck the 
statute down as invalid on vagueness 
grounds. The court reasoned that terms 
such as "regardless of whether there is a 
legal basis for the arrest" and "interferes" 
could have a number of meanings and in-
terpretations. On that basis, this court 
concluded that the statute "fail[ed] to in-
form an ordinary citizen who is seeking to 
obey the laws as to the conduct sought to 
be proscribed." Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 
802. 
Although the Bradshaw majority did not 
decide the case on the basis that a person 
had a right, constitutional or otherwise, to 
use force to resist an illegal arrest, it did 
reach this issue in dictum. Justice Tuck-
ett's opinion stated: 
If the intention of the legislature was 
to penalize a law-abiding citizen by incar-
ceration because he [or she] did not will-
ingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a 
statute authorizing the same is in viola-
tion of both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions . . . in that it permits and 
authorizes an arrest without probable 
cause and without lawful basis for the 
arrest. 
Id. at 801. Justice Henriod, in his separate 
concurrence, stated that he would have 
struck the statute down not only on vague-
ness grounds, but also on the ground that 
the statute violated the state search and 
seizure provisions by making unlawful any 
resistance to an illegal arrest. Id. at 803-
05. 
The two dissenters wrote separate opin-
ions. Each disagreed with the statement in 
the majority opinion that it would be uncon-
stitutional for the legislature to make it 
unlawful to resist an illegal arrest. Id. at 
805 (Ellett, J., dissenting); id. at 806 
(Crockett, J., dissenting). Justice Ellett ex-
plained his view of the matter by noting: 
The common law gave a person the 
right to resist an unlawful arrest, but 
times have changed since the time when 
self-help was permitted to prevent a 
wrongful arrest. At common law, ar-
rests were often made by citizens. 
Judges were not available for speedy re-
lease on bond, and trials were long de-
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laved. Such conditions no longer exist. 
An arrested person must be taken forth-
with before a magistrate, and trial must 
not be unreasonably delayed. A defen-
dant is entitled to bail in a reasonable 
amount. 
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 805. In his view, 
these protections mooted the majority's ob-
jection to the statute's substance. "[The 
statute] does not permit an unlawful sei-
zure (arrest). It merely transfers the right 
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the 
orderly procedure of a court trial instead of 
a brawl in the streets." Id. 
Gardiner asserts that the majority in 
Bradshaw adopted the common law right 
to forcibly resist an illegal search or arrest. 
We acknowledge that the language of both 
Justice Tuckett's majority opinion and Jus-
tice Henriod's concurrence does suggest 
not only a common law right to forcibly 
resist an illegal arrest and, by extension, 
an illegal search, but also a state and feder-
al constitutional right as well. However, 
no matter how strongly a majority of the 
members of the court which sat on Brad-
shaw in 1975 felt about this issue, they did 
not decide the case on this ground. The 
majority's holding of unconstitutionality 
was based on vagueness alone. Any dis-
cussion of the substantive right to resist is 
dictum only, and this court is not bound by 
earlier dicta. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d 388, 400 (Utah 1989). Therefore, the 
comments of the majority in Bradshaw on 
this issue are not controlling, and this court 
has yet to pass upon whether Utah recog-
nizes the availability of a common law right 
to forcibly resist an illegal search or arrest 
and the scope of that right. 
The English common law right to forci-
bly resist one attempting to effect an il-
legal arrest was established almost three 
hundred years ago in Regina v. Tooley, 2 
Ld. Raymond Rep. 1296, 1299-1301 (Q.B. 
1709). As Justice Ellett's dissent in Brad-
shaw noted, the Tooley case was decided at 
a time when an illegal arrest posed grave 
risks for a defendant. Most arrests were 
made by private citizens, not by public offi-
cers. Bail for felonies was unattainable, 
and years might pass before royal judges 
arrived for a jail delivery. Under such 
circumstances, there was no speedy or ef-
fective way to challenge an illegal arrest 
The adoption of the Tooley rule seemed at 
that time both reasonable and justifiable 
See S. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 
28 Va.L.Rev. 315, 330 (1942) [hereinafter 
"Warner"]. 
However, this common law right has 
been subjected to extensive criticism. See, 
e.g., State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 147f 
568 P.2d 1040, 1045 (1977); People v. Hess, 
687 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1984); Wamer at 
330-31. The criticism of the self-help doc-
trine is based on the fact, noted by Justice 
Ellett's dissent, that the dangers flowing 
from illegal arrests which existed when the 
rule was adopted are substantially reduced 
today. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 805 (Ellett, 
J., dissenting). An arrestee now has the 
"benefits of liberal bonding policies, ap-
pointed counsel in the case of indigency, 
and the opportunity to be taken before a 
magistrate for immediate arraignment and 
preliminary hearing." State v. Richard-
son, 95 Idaho 446, 450, 511 P.2d 263, 267 
(1973). 
Similar considerations support a rejection 
of the doctrine where illegal searches are 
concerned. The Supreme Court of New 
Mexico in State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 
P.2d 464 (1978), summarized the dangers of 
the common law self-help rule and its rea-
sons for rejecting that rule where searches 
are concerned: 
Self-help measures undertaken by a 
potential defendant who objects to the 
legality of the search can lead to violence 
and serious physical injury. The societal 
interest in the orderly settlement of dis-
putes between citizens and their govern-
ment outweighs any individual interest in 
resisting a questionable search. One can 
reasonably be asked to submit peaceably 
and to take recourse in his legal reme-
dies. 
Doe, 92 N.M. at 102-03, 583 P.2d at 466-67 
(citations omitted). Further, in cases of 
illegal police searches, the subject of the 
search has "the assurance that any evi-
dence so acquired is rendered inadmissible 
in a subsequent criminal trial." United 
Suites ex re I. Kilheffer v. 
F.SupP- 677, 680-81 (E.D.Pa.l9T6); see also 
S::zie\\ Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 471 (Utah 
1990). This was most certainly not the 
case at common law. 
Because the justification for the common 
law doctrine has all but disappeared, and 
because of its potential for causing violent 
confrontations between police, who are 
usually armed, and private citizens, the 
modern trend is to reject the common law 
risrht.2 Thus, in most states a citizen may 
no: use force to resist an illegal arrest 
unless the officer uses excessive force. 
Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596, 
600, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (1983).3 
For like reasons, some courts have ex-
tended this rejection of the common law 
right to resist an illegal arrest to illegal 
searches as well, including the Supreme 
Court of Alaska in the decision relied upon 
by zhe court of appeals, Elson v. State, 659 
P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983). In that case, the 
defendant had been pulled over for suspi-
cion of drunk driving. As the officer per-
formed a "pat down," he noticed a hard 
object in the defendant's right pants pock-
et. The officer then attempted to remove 
the object, and the defendant resisted. Be-
fore the Alaska Supreme Court, the defen-
dant argued that he had a constitutional 
right to forcibly resist what he believed to 
be an illegal search. The court disagreed 
and held, "[A] private citizen may not use 
force to resist a peaceful search by one 
who he knows or has good reason to be-
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Plowfield, 409 lieve is an authorized police officer per-
forming his duties, regardless of whether 
the search is ultimately determined to be 
illegal." Id. at 1200. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico had 
previously come to the same conclusion and 
adopted a rule similar to that in Elson. 
Doe, 92 N.M. at 102-03, 583 P.2d at 467; 
see also United States v. Ferrone, 438 
F.2d 381, 390 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 402 
U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 2188, 29 L.Ed.2d 430 
(1971) (a person cannot forcibly resist a 
peace officer's execution of a search war-
rant later found to be illegal); Hatton, 116 
Ariz, at 148, 568 P.2d at 1046. 
[4] Based on the foregoing discussion 
and the trend in other states, were we free 
to do so, we would be inclined to reject the 
English common law and adopt the diluted 
defense to an illegal search or arrest artic-
ulated in Elson and similar decisions.4 
However, we conclude that we are not free 
to fashion such a rule because the legisla-
ture has already acted in the area. Com-
mon law rights to resist arrest are not 
relevant where the common law has been 
replaced by statute. 
When the Utah legislature enacted the 
Utah criminal code in 1973, it abolished all 
common law crimes. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-105 (1973). Now, in Utah a person 
is guilty of a crime only if that person's 
actions and state of mind fit within the 
statutory definitional elements of a crime. 
E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105; State v. 
2. In the following cases, courts have rejected the 
common law rule: Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 
427 (Alaska 1969); State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 
142, 147-48, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (1977); 
Stats v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 451, 511 P.2d 
263, 268 (1973); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 
607, 610-11 (Iowa 1978); State v. Austin, 381 
A.2d 652, 655 (Me.1978); In re Welfare of Burns, 
284 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1979); State v. 
Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1977); State v. Koonce, 89 NJ.Super. 169, 183-
84, 214 A.2d 428, 435-36 (1965); State v. Doe, 92 
N.M. 100, 102-03, 583 P.2d 464, 467 (1978); 
Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St.2d 173, 179-80, 
324 N.E.2d 735 (1975). 
3. In Moreira, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts conducted an in-depth analysis of 
this issue. Through its research, it concluded 
that at that time eleven states by judicial deci-
sion and nineteen states by legislative enact-
ment had determined that "a person may not 
resist an unlawful arrest which is accomplished 
without excessive force." Moreira, 388 Mass. at 
600, 447 N.E.2d at 1228. 
-. The Alaska Supreme Court addressed an addi-
tional issue in Elson. A footnote in that deci-
sion warned that the rule it adopted barring the 
use of force to oppose a search does not apply 
where the officer uses "excessive or unnecessary 
force in conducting the search." Elson, 659 
P.2d at 1200 n. 18. This qualification resulted 
from the court's concern that in instances where 
the officer uses excessive force in effecting a 
search, the defendant must have the legal right 
to defend against that excessive force. See Gray 
v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970). Were 
we to adopt the approach, we would incorporate 
this view into our test. 
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Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982). 
State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406., 408 n. 4 
(Utah 1984). Similarly, the legislature en-
acted a number of general defenses as well 
as numerous specific defenses which are 
included in the various statutory provi-
sions. However, in codifying these defens-
es, it did not enact a generally available 
defense based on the illegality of police 
conduct. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-401 
to -406 (codifying defenses for minority, 
compulsion, entrapment, ignorance of fact 
which negates specific mental state, and 
mental illness). We consider the enact-
ment of these specific and varied defenses 
and the failure to enact any general illegali-
ty defense to impliedly preclude us from 
finding any generally available common 
law right to resist an illegal search or 
arrest. If such a defense exists in Utah, it 
must be grounded in the specific code sec-
tions under which Gardiner was convicted. 
[5] The first crime of which he was 
convicted is assault on a peace officer, a 
crime under section 76-5-102.4 of the Code. 
Section 76-5-102.4 provides: 
Any person who assaults a peace offi-
cer, with knowledge that he [or she] is a 
peace officer, and when the peace officer 
is acting within the scope of his [or her] 
authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990). The 
only language in this section that could be 
construed as giving any sanction to a right 
to resist an unlawful arrest is the phrase 
"and when the peace officer is acting with-
in the scope of his [or her] authority as a 
peace officer." However, this is not equiv-
alent to the common law defense. Under 
section 76-5-102.4, the State must show, as 
an element of proof of the offense, that the 
officer was "acting within the scope of his 
[or her] authority as a peace officer." The 
defendant has no burden of proof on the 
issue, as was the case at common law and 
as would be true even under the modern 
trend. 
On the other hand, the statute does not 
require that the State prove that the pre-
cise act the officer is performing is not 
legally challengeable, i.e., that the arrest or 
search being effected is entirely lawful and 
beyond challenge. All that must be shown 
is that the officer is acting within the 
"scope of authority of a peace officer." In 
this respect, section 76-5-102.4 would ap-
pear from its plain language to reject the 
narrow common law approach endorsed in 
Bradshaw that authorized resistance if the 
arrest was unlawful in any particular and 
instead to have opted for an approach that, 
in operation, will be closer to the modem 
trend. Where the officer is not acting 
wholly outside the scope of his or her au-
thority, the police action may not be resist-
ed. The fine question of legality must be 
determined in subsequent judicial proceed-
ings, not in the street. In interpreting the 
language "scope of authority," we find il-
lustrative the Second Circuit's decision in 
United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 
245 (2d Cir.1967). There, it stated that the 
test is whether an officer is doing what he 
or she was employed to do or is "engaging 
in a personal frolic of his [or her] own." 
Id. 
Gardiner and Judge Bench argue that 
Gardiner should be acquitted because Hat-
zidakis was not acting within the scope of 
his authority when he conducted what was 
later determined to be an unlawful search. 
However, this position ignores the lan-
guage of the statute in an attempt to reach 
a result the Bradshaw dictum would sanc-
tion. 
[6] Having isolated the legal standard, 
we must determine whether it was met 
here. We note that in cases involving 
mixed questions of fact and law where the 
judge makes a determination on contested 
facts, we view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling 
and reverse only if the necessary factual 
findings implicit in the court's ruling lack 
sufficient evidentiary support. See Gray-
son-Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987); 
Utah R. Civ.P. 52(a). In reviewing the 
application of the law to those facts and 
findings, we apply a correctness standard 
and reverse if the legal standard is not 
satisfied. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
STATE v. GARDINER 
Cite as 814 P.2d 563 (Utah 1991) 
Utah 575 
SaU Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 
,Y>.ah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
p.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985): Margulies v. 
Cpchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). 
Viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court, the facts are that Officer Hatzi-
dakis responded to an anonymous phone 
call reporting a loud party at the Vernal 
Airport. He was in uniform and on duty at 
the time he responded to the call. Upon 
arrival at the scene, he informed Gardiner 
and others that he was a police officer and 
intended to search the building because he 
saw persons he believed to be minors con-
suming alcohol inside. When Hatzidakis 
informed Gardiner that he did not have a 
search warrant, Gardiner told the officer 
he could not enter and physically confront-
ed the officer. The trial court found that 
Gardiner's ''demeanor . . . was hostile and 
threatening." At this point, Hatzidakis 
pushed Gardiner away from the door, and 
Gardiner fell onto a card table that crashed 
under his weight. We find these factual 
findings to have adequate evidentiary sup-
port in the record. Considering the circum-
stances Officer Hatzidakis faced at this 
point, we conclude that the trial court did 
not err in finding that the force used as a 
matter of law to pursue the search was 
"not excessive" and was "reasonable in 
view of the circumstances." Gardiner then 
got up from the ground, charged Hatzidak-
is, and hit him in the face, knocking him 
out of the building. The melee continued 
outside the building, even after Hatzidakis 
informed Gardiner he was under arrest. 
From these facts, it is clear that there is 
sufficient evidence to find that Gardiner 
was guilty of assaulting a peace officer 
under section 76-5-102.4 while that officer 
was attempting to conduct a search in the 
course of a criminal investigation and then 
effect an arrest. 
Was the officer "acting within the scope 
of his authority as a peace officer"? We 
think the evidence is ample to support the 
trial court's conclusion that he was. The 
fact that his attempted search was later 
found to be unlawful does not divest him of 
his authority. See United HeTiczer, 373 
F.2d at 245. 
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[7] Turning to the second count for 
which Gardiner was convicted, section 76-
8-305 provides: 
A person is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor if he [or she] has knowledge, or 
by the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have knowledge, that a peace offi-
cer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or 
detention of himself [or herself] or anoth-
er and interferes with such arrest or 
detention by use of force or by use of 
any weapon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp.1990). 
Without recounting the events that precip-
itated the brawl, it is clear that when Gard-
iner hit the officer the first time, he had 
violated section 76-5-102.4. It was after 
this punch and during the ensuing fight 
outside the building that Hatzidakis in-
formed Gardiner that he was under arrest. 
The record is clear that Gardiner was 
aware of Hatzidakis's attempt to place him 
under arrest. In fact, after Hatzidakis in-
formed him that he was under arrest, 
Gardiner contended that he was not and 
then proceeded to hit Hatzidakis again in 
the face. This evidence is sufficient to 
support a conviction under section 76-8-
305. Gardiner points to the illegality of the 
underlying search as justification for his 
attacking and continuing to. fight Hatzidak-
is. However, as noted above, this is not a 
sufficient ground to assault a peace officer. 
[8] Gardiner relies also on sections 76-
2-405 and -406 as articulating a right to 
physically resist Hatzidakis's search. Sec-
tion 76-2-405 gives a person the right to 
use reasonable force to "prevent" or "ter-
minate" another's unlawful entry or attack 
upon his [or her] "habitation." That sec-
tion states: "A person is justified in using 
force against another when and to the ex-
tent that he [or she] reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate the other's unlawful entry into 
or attack upon his [or her] habitation 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1990) (empha-
sis added). Because no place of habitation 
is involved here, only a place of business, 
by its terms section 76-2-405 has no appli-
cation to our case. 
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[9] As for section 76-2-406, it provides: 
"A person is justified in using force, other 
than dead// force, against another when 
and to the extent that he [or she] reason-
ably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference 
with real property or personal property." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1990). This 
section does permit the use of force to 
prevent a criminal interference with real 
property, and it could be construed to cover 
an illegal search of commercial premises. 
However, section 76-2-406 does not explic-
itly mention peace officers. For reasons 
common to sections 76-2-405 and -406, we 
conclude that that legislative silence indi-
cates an intention that the actions of law 
enforcement officers taken within the 
course of their duties are not within the 
category of intrusions that may be lawfully 
resisted. 
Both section 76-2-405 and section 76-2-
406 were enacted in 1973 when the version 
of section 76-8-305 struck down by Brad-
shaw was still in force. That section made 
it illegal to resist arrest or detainment by a 
peace officer without regard to its legality. 
Thus, interpreting section 76-2-406 to in-
clude within its scope peace officers acting 
in the furtherance of their duty would 
bring section 76-2-406 into direct conflict 
with then-section 76-8-305. We conclude 
that the legislature intended section 76-2-
406 and section 76-2-405 to exclude peace 
officers acting in the course of their duties 
from their operation. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
STEWART, Justice (dissenting). 
I join in Judge Bench's dissent and add 
the following comments. The majority 
opinion allows the State to charge a citizen 
who is physically attacked by a police offi-
cer for resisting an unlawful and unconsti-
tutional act with the crimes of interfering 
with a police officer and assault on a police 
officer. Although the defendant fought 
back after the officer's initial attack, it is 
perfectly clear that the officer initiated the 
violence and then arrested the defendant 
for fighting back. The shocking conse-
quence of the Court's ruling is that an 
officer seeking to conduct an unconstitu-
tional search may physically attack a citi-
zen and then charge that citizen with a 
crime for defending himself. The majori-
ty's holding that the police officer's con-
duct was within his "scope of authority" [3 
plainly startling. To reach such an eccen-
tric result, the Court ignores legislative 
intent expressed in an amendment to the 
assault statute, opts to follow what it says 
is the trend of cases, and simply ignores 
the constitutional right that the defendant 
was entitled to rely on. 
The incident in this case was precipitated 
when a Vernal City police officer undertook 
a concededly unconstitutional search which 
the defendant resisted by placing his arm 
in a position to bar the doorway when he 
found the officer had no warrant. The 
officer then shoved the defendant back-
ward with such force that he was thrown a 
distance of eight feet against a table that 
collapsed. 
Gardiner was charged with and convicted 
of assault against a peace officer in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990) 
and interfering with a peace officer in vio-
lation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(1990). The bulk of the majority opinion is 
addressed to the question of whether a 
citizen has a common law defense of self-
defense to unlawful action by a police offi-
cer. The majority does not give any 
weight to the fact that the officer initiated 
the violence. The majority and the trial 
courts try to tiptoe around the issue on the 
trial court's finding that the defendant ini-
tiated the violence because the defendant's 
"demeanor" was "hostile." Apparently cit-
izens must be either meek when their 
rights are violated or suffer police-initiated 
violence. It is, of course, clear that if that 
conviction fails, the other conviction must 
also fail because the arrest would be un-
lawful, as Judge Bench states. 
The key issue in this case, as Judge 
Bench points out, is whether the State 
proved the elements of the crime of assault 
on a police officer. The majority pays 
scant attention to the issue and deals with 
it in a" most conclusory fashion. The iegis-
STATE v. 
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ladve history of the assault statute gives 
guidance in construing that provision. A 
1987 amendment to that statute indicates a 
legislative intent to make an assault on an 
officer a crime only when the officer is 
acting within his or her authority. It is not 
enough to show that an officer was on duty 
and performing his duties. Prior to the 
19ST amendment, the assault statute read: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, 
with knowledge that he is on duty, is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1978) (em-
phasis added). The amendment made clear 
that being "on duty" was not sufficient. 
The amended statute now reads: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, 
with knowledge that he is a peace offi-
cer, and when the peace officer is acting 
within the scope of his authority as a 
peace officer, is guilty of a class A mis-
demeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990) (em-
phasis added). Now, to constitute a crime, 
an assault must be directed against an 
officer who is acting "within the scope of 
his authority." 
After Officer Hatzidakis announced his 
intention to enter the hangar to check for 
minors, Gardiner, who was in the building, 
told the officer his name and that his fa-
ther owned the building. Gardiner asked 
Hatzidakis if he had a warrant, and the 
officer replied that he did not. Gardiner 
then told Hatzidakis he could not enter the 
building and stepped forward and extended 
his arm to block Hatzidakis's entry. No 
physical contact occurred between Gard-
iner and the officer when Gardiner blocked 
the doorway. At this point, the officer 
shoved Gardiner. The trial court found 
that Hatzidakis "perceived" Gardiner's ac-
tion in blocking the doorway to be threaten-
ing and on that basis found that the offi-
cer's use of force was reasonable and not 
excessive. That finding is wrong; the fact 
1. Gardiner's actions were in response to an il-
legal search, but many of the cases deal with an 
unlawful arrest. An illegal search may be as 
invasive as an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., People 
v. Wetzel, 11 Cai.3d 104, 113 Cal.Rptr. 32, 520 
P.2d 416 (1974); State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 
433, 465 A.2d 323 (1983). See generally 1 W. 
GARDINER Utah 577 
* 568 (Utah 1991) 
is undisputed Chat the officer initiated the 
first use of force and that force was clearly 
excessive. 
The Fourth Amendment gives a citizen a 
right to refuse to consent to an entry and 
search. The assertion of that right cannot 
be a crime.1 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2050, 36 
L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-33, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 
1731-33, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); United 
States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th 
Cir.1978); City of Middle burg Heights v. 
Theiss, 28 Ohio App.3d 1, 4, 501 N.E.2d 
1226, 1229 (1985). See generally 1 W. La-
Fave, Search and Seizure § 1.13(b) (2d ed. 
1987). Despite that law, the majority holds 
that the officer acted within the scope of 
his authority because he "responded to an 
anonymous phone call" to investigate a 
"loud party" and was "in uniform and on 
duty at the time he responded to the call." 
That is tantamount to saying that virtually 
anything an officer does is within his au-
thority. 
The better-reasoned cases reject that ap-
proach. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in 
State v. Wilkersont 114 Idaho 174, 180, 755 
P.2d 471, 477 (Idaho Ct.App.), affd, 115 
Idaho 357, 766 P.2d 1238 (1988), construed 
a statute which used the phrase "duty of 
his office" and stated that the phrase in-
cludes "only those lawful and authorized 
acts of a public officer. To hold otherwise 
would clothe an officer with protection 
from resistance based only on his status as 
an officer and would render the [balance of 
the statute] mere surplusage." An illegal 
search by an officer cannot be within the 
officer's scope of authority. People v. 
Swiercz, 104 Ill.App.3d 733, 737, 60 Ill.Dec. 
1, 2, 432 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1982), held that 
an officer's entry into an apartment with-
out a warrant and without exigent circum-
stances to search for a suspect was not an 
"authorized act" which was required to 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.13 (2d ed. 1987). 
Furthermore, a person cannot be convicted of a 
crime for failing to obey a police officer's order 
if that order is violative of the United States 
Constitution. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 
291-92, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 1245, 10 L.Ed.2d 349 
(1963). 
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support a conviction for obstructing a po-
lice officer. In State v. Hauan, 361 
N.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Iowa Ct.App.1984), the 
court ruled that an officer who exceeded 
the scope of a search warrant was not 
engaged in his ''official duties" and, there-
fore, the defendant was not guilty of inter-
ference with official acts. In my view, the 
officer's use of force in executing an illegal 
search in this case was not within the scope 
of his authority. Even if the law were 
otherwise, it is beyond question that an 
officer who physically attacks a citizen for 
refusing to consent to an illegal search is 
patently beyond his authority. 
The majority asserts the position, also 
expressed in Justice Ellett's dissent in 
State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 805-06 
(Utah 1975), that procedural safeguards 
are sufficient to protect the rights of those 
who are unlawfully arrested. In my view, 
that position is unrealistic. One author has 
observed that "such protections are realiza-
ble only if the defendant has some reliable 
way of showing that the police acted un-
constitutionally." Chevigny, The Right to 
Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 
1128, 1134-35 (1969). The remedies the 
majority relies on to justify denying a citi-
zen the right to resist unlawful conduct are 
of little value. A citizen who must endure 
a stay in jail and the expense of posting 
bail and obtaining an attorney is simply 
doubly wronged. Empirical studies show 
that administrative review of police abuse 
is ineffectual as a remedy for police mis-
conduct; civil damages are inadequate be-
cause an "action may take several years, 
and the plaintiff may have a difficult time 
finding a lawyer willing to spend the neces-
sary time on his case unless he has been 
injured badly enough to give rise to large 
damages." Id. at 1135-36. 
The majority opinion abolishes the right 
of a citizen to use reasonable force to resist 
an unlawful act by a police officer and 
holds that the criminal code does not pro-
vide for a defense of reasonable resistance 
to unlawful police conduct. This construc-
tion of the criminal code is erroneous. The 
majority states that "the enactment of . . . 
specific and varied defenses and the failure 
to enact any general illegality defense . . . 
impliedly preclude[s] us from finding anv 
generally available common law right to 
resist... .*' In essence, the majority con-
cludes that only statutorily defined defens-
es are available in Utah. The code does 
not purport to state the only allowable de-
fenses. For example, in State v. Sessions, 
645 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982), we recognized a 
defense not then found in the code, al-
though that defense is now contained in the 
code. Furthermore, everyday practice and 
common sense disprove the majority's cas-
ual assertion that only statutory defenses 
are recognized in Utah. For example, for-
mer jeopardy is a constitutional defense not 
mentioned in that part of the code dealing 
with affirmative defenses. Beyond doubt, 
that defense is, and must be, recognized in 
Utah. 
The majority's position is unsupported by 
any authority from a state which has 
adopted the Model Penal Code and is sim-
ply incorrect. The current criminal code 
was adopted from the Model Penal Code. 
The commentaries to the Model Penal Code 
state: 
The status of common law defenses 
. . . is not entirely clear. Of the jurisdic-
tions that have enacted or proposed re-
vised penal codes since promulgation of 
the Model Penal Code, six have specifi-
cally .retained common law defenses. 
Five of these are jurisdictions that have 
abolished or would abolish common law 
offenses; one jurisdiction, Florida, has 
explicit provisions retaining both com-
mon law offenses and common law de-
fenses Only the proposed code of 
Maryland specifically abolishes common 
law defenses. 
Even some of those enacted and pro-
posed codes that explicitly state that de-
fenses shall be governed by their provi-
sions may not be entirely clear with re-
spect to common law defenses. While 
such provisions would appear to be limit-
ing defenses to those provided by the 
code, two that state that the code "shall 
govern . . . the construction and applica-
tion of any defense . . . , " specifically re-
tain common law defenses. 
STATE v. GARDINER 
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Model Penal Code § 1.05 comment 5, at 
S2-S3 (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985) (footnotes omitted). The com-
ment notes that although adoption of the 
Model Penal Code "should render common 
law defenses unnecessary," the issue is 
dependent on the nuances of the code in 
each jurisdiction, and the "significance of 
common law defenses would be greater" in 
some jurisdictions. Id. at 83 & n. 53. 
I submit that a citizen should have the 
right to resist, in a reasonable manner, acts 
that are clearly unlawful. Although fine 
points of law ought not to be a spark for 
violent confrontations, the law ought to 
favor the citizen against clearly unconstitu-
tional conduct, most especially when an 
officer initiates violence and uses excessive 
force. "The purpose of the right is not to 
encourage violent attacks on policemen, 
but to preserve the sense of personal liber-
ty inherent in the right to reject arbitrary 
orders." Chevigny, The Right to Resist an 
Unlawful Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 1128, 1150 
(1969). 
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge 
(dissenting). 
When all is said and done, the majority 
recognizes that this is a case of statutory 
construction. I dissent because I disagree 
with the majority's construction of the stat-
utes Gardiner was accused of violating. 
In construing a statute, the primary fo-
cus should be on the. statutory text, the 
words employed by the Legislature to ex-
press its intent, because "the best indica-
tion of legislative intent is the statute's 
plain language." Berube v. Fashion Cen-
tre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
Thus, "[wjhere statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, this Court will not look 
beyond to divine legislative intent. In-
stead, we are guided by the rule that a 
statute should be construed according to its 
plain language." Allisen v. American Le-
gion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 
1. Gardiner argues that the search in this case 
was unlawful. The State does not refute that 
argument, and the majority notes "its accept-
ance of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
Officer Hatzidakis's search of the building was 
1988); see also Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 
P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 19897. 
However, rather than taking the statu-
tory text as its starting point, the majority 
begins by dusting off what it admits is an 
obsolete common law defense in order to 
kill an already dead letter, noting along the 
way the evils of self-help. Whatever those 
evils may be, they are not the point. The 
real issue in this case is whether the Legis-
lature intended Gardiner's conduct to be a 
criminal offense. The majority roams far 
afield from what the Legislature clearly 
said, perhaps because the Legislature quite 
plainly intended a result different from 
that which the majority strains to accom-
plish. 
SECTION 76-5-102.4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990) es-
calates the penalty for assault, ordinarily a 
class B misdemeanor, to a class A misde-
meanor when the defendant has "as-
saulted] a peace officer, with knowledge 
that he is a peace officer, and when the 
peace officer is acting within the scope of 
his authority as a peace officer." By the 
plain meaning of these words, the Legisla-
ture did not intend them to encompass a 
peace officer performing clearly illegal ac-
tivity, such as the illegal search and the 
unnecessary use of force in this case.1 
However, the majority concludes that an 
illegal search is within the scope of a peace 
officer's authority. Cf. State ex rel. Hur-
ley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972). It 
seems highly implausible that the Legisla-
ture considered peace officers to have au-
thority to do illegal acts. 
I also do not believe that the Legislature 
intended to subvert the fourth amendment 
by including within the "scope of [a peace 
officers] authority" the power to perform 
clearly unreasonable searches. The right 
"to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches" means more than simply the 
right to exclude at trial illegally obtained 
illegal." Accepting the facts as stated by the 
majority, it seems strikingly obvious that the 
search in this case violated the fourth amend-
ment. 
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evidence. The fourth amendment was in-
tended as a limitation on governmental 
power.2 The exclusion of evidence is mere-
ly one of the means for effecting that 
limitation. See Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 
(1914). By concluding that performing a 
clearly illegal search was within the scope 
of Officer Hatzidakis's authority, the ma-
jority severely undermines the right to be 
secure from unreasonable searches. In-
stead of undermining the Constitution, the 
majority should follow the statute's plain 
meaning, which is in harmony with the 
Constitution. See Chris & Dick's Lumber 
& Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 
516 (Utah 1990). 
The only support the majority offers in 
explaining away the scope-of-authority 
wording of section 76-5-102.4 is United 
States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d 
Cir.1967), which upheld the conviction of a 
bystander who resisted an arrest that the 
jury found to be lawful as a citizen's arrest 
under New York law. Heliczer's dicta 
criticizing the common law right to resist 
an unlawful arrest within the scope of a 
peace officer's authority are an extremely 
weak basis for explaining away the plain 
meaning of the Utah statute increasing the 
penalty for assault only if the victim is "a 
peace officer acting within the scope of his 
authority." Obiter remarks from another 
jurisdiction in another factual context are 
no basis to interpret "[unambiguous lan-
guage in [a] statute . . . so as to contradict 
its plain meaning." Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1990); Johnson v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 
95 (Utah 1988). 
Thus, the majority contradicts the plain 
meaning of the Utah statute by including 
within the "scope of [a peace officer's] 
authority" the power to conduct illegal 
searches in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. 
2. Drawing from their experience under British 
colonial rule, the framers sought to ensure that 
general warrants and writs of assistance would 
have no place in the new government. See 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 740-42 (Utah Ct. 
App.1991) (explaining development of the exclu-
SECTION 76-8-305 
Gardiner was also convicted of interfer-
ing with a lawful arrest in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1990), which pro-
vides: 
A person is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor if he has knowledge or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have 
knowledge that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of 
himself or another and interferes with 
such arrest or detention by use of force 
or by use of any weapon. 
The State recognizes that the principal 
difficulty in applying this section to Gard-
iner is the phrase requiring "knowledge 
that a peace officer is seeking to effect a 
lawful arrest or detention of [the defen-
dant] or another." Gardiner argues that 
his arrest was not lawful, and the State 
essentially conceded that point in oral argu-
ment and asked us to avoid considering the 
lawfulness of the arrest. Nevertheless, 
the majority proceeds to affirm Gardiner's 
conviction under this section without ever 
confronting the question whether Gardiner 
knew that Officer Hatzidakis was "seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest." Gardiner's posi-
tion has been that the arrest was not law-
ful; in his mind, he was resisting an un-
lawful arrest, an act which section 76-8-
305 does not penalize. Since the State con-
cedes this point, it has not established a 
violation of section 76-8-305, and Gard-
iner's conviction under that section should 
be reversed. See Hurley. 28 Utah 2d 248. 
501 P.2d 111 (reversing a conviction for 
interfering with an arrest by an officer 
exceeding the duties of his office). 
CONCLUSION 
I would hold that the officer was not 
acting "within the scope of his authority" 
for purposes of section 76-5-102.4 and 
would accordingly reverse Gardiner's con-
viction under that section. I would also 
sionary rule); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. 
Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure Cases, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1365, 1369 
(1983). 
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reverse his conviction under section 76-8-
305 because, as the State concedes, Gard-
ner was not knowingly interfering with a 
•^ace officer "seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest." Since the State fails to establish a 
orima facie case under either statute, I see 
no need to consider defenses that could 
apply-
Finally, and with hindsight, I agree with 
the majority's comment that the Court of 
Appeals should have published its opinion 
in this case. In my view, publication of 
appellate opinions serves essentially two 
important purposes: It records and dissem-
inates the development of the common 
law,3 and it enables the public to monitor 
the quality of appellate judicial service.4 
However, some cases coming before a 
court hearing appeals as of right do not 
present issues that could enhance the de-
velopment of the common law, and publica-
tion of the greater part of an Appellate 
Court's decisions provides an adequate 
sampling of Judicial performance. If a 
particular case has negligible value as 
precedent, the parties are better served by 
dispensing with publication and the greater 
delay it necessitates. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., does not 
participate herein. 
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM V 
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, 
INC., Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF the UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
No. 900325. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 24, 1991. 
Taxpayer* sought review of determina-
tion of Tax Commission that expenditures 
3- M. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 
4-5 (1988). 
made in construction of facilities used in 
production of sodium azide pellets and ig-
niter material were not exempt from sales 
and use tax. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) materials used in con-
struction of production facilities did not 
qualify for exemption from sales and use 
tax, and (2) shells of production facilities 
were not "equipment" exempt from sales 
and use tax. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<e=>764 
Same standard used for determining 
harmfulness of error in appeals from judi-
cial proceedings applies to review of agen-
cy action and under that standard, error 
will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconse-
quential that there is no reasonable likeli-
hood that error affected outcome of pro-
ceedings. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4). 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
0=781 
It is not characterization of issue as 
mixed question of fact and law or charac-
terization of issue as question of general 
law that is dispositive of determination of 
appropriate level of judicial review of agen-
cy action; rather, dispositive factor is 
whether agency, by virtue of its experience 
or expertise, is in a better position than 
courts to give effect to regulatory objective 
to be achieved. 
3. Statutes €=219(2) 
When legislative intent concerning spe-
cific question at issue can be derived 
through traditional methods of statutory 
construction, agency's interpretation will 
be granted no deference and statute will be 
interpreted in accord with its legislative 
intent. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
4. Statutes <3=>219(1) 
Agency's statutory construction should 
only be given deference when there is 
4. K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 81 (rev. ed. 
1950). 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Allen BRADSHAW, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14060. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 16, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., of intentionally interfering with 
a law enforcement official seeking to ef-
fect an arrest, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tuckett, J., held that the stat-
ute under which defendant was convicted 
was unconstitutionally vague. 
Reversed and remanded for dismissal. 
Henriod, C. J., filed a concurring opin-
ion. 
Ellett and Crockett, JJ., dissented and 
filed separate opinions. 
Criminal Law <§=»I3.I(2) 
Statute making any person guilty of 
a misdemeanor when he "intentionally in-
terferes with
 a * * * law enforcement 
official seeking to effect an arrest or de-
tention of himself * * * regardless of 
whether there is a legal basis for the ar-
rest'' may be subject to various meanings 
and interpretations, fails to inform ordi-
nary citizen who is seeking to obey the 
laws as to conduct sought to be proscribed, 
and therefore is unconstitutional as per-
mitting arrest without probable cause and 
without lawful basis. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-
305; Const, art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 4. 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for de-
fendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
John O. Christiansen, Beaver County 
Atty., Beaver, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
After a trial de novo in the district coun 
defendant was found guilty oi viola:--. 
Sec. 76-8-305, U.C.A.1953, as amended. 
which reads as follows: 
A person is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor when he intentionally interferes 
with a person recognized to be a law en-
forcement official seeking to effect a» 
arrest or detention of himself or another' 
regardless of whether there is a legal 
basis for the arrest. 
The defendant was sentenced to serve six 
months in the county jail. From the ver-
dict and sentence the defendant has ap-
pealed claiming that the statute above re-
ferred to is invalid on constitutional 
grounds. 
The complainant is a policeman of Mil-
ford City, Beaver County, Utah, who ob-
served the defendant driving an automobile ' 
on the streets of that city. The officer fol-
lowed the defendant to a service station 
where he informed the defendant that he 
was going to issue the defendant a citation 
for driving while his driver's license was 
suspended. After the defendant had com-
pleted the purchase of gasoline he drove 
away from the service station a short dis-
tance to a hotel where he resided. The of-
ficer followed the defendant in a patrol 
car with the siren going. At the hotel, the 
officer informed the defendant that he was 
under arrest for resisting arrest, at which 
time the officer pulled his revolver from 
the holster. The defendant tapped the of-
ficer on the chest and told the officer that 
he did not have the "guts" to shoot, where-
upon he left the scene and entered the 
hotel. At the service station where the of-
ficer first accosted the defendant, the of-
ficer did not ask the defendant to produce 
a driver's license. The accusation that the 
defendant was operating an automobile dur-
ing suspension was untrue, and the defend-
ant "did in fact have a valid driver's license. 
It is doubtful whether or not the record 
supports the conviction of the defendant 
inasmuch as the officer made no effort 
STATE v. BRADSHAW 
Cite as 5*1 P.2d 300 
Utah 801 
.0 ::«.ke custody of the defendant, and it is 
:oubctLiI whether or not the act of the de-
fendant in simply ignoring the officer is 
a n interference with him. On appeal we 
jre only concerned, however, with the de-
fendant's challenge to the statute. In pass-
in0" we point out that the officer accused 
the defendant of violation of the Motor 
Vehicle Code, and the provisions of that 
code should have been followed by the of-
ficer in dealing with the purported viola-
:ion. The provisions of Sec. 41-6-166, U. 
C.A.1953, are controlling in situations sim-
ilar to the one herein. A pertinent part 
of that section is as follows: 
Whenever any person is arrested for 
any violation of this act punishable as 
a misdemeanor, the arrested person shall 
be immediately taken before a magistrate 
within the county in which the offense 
charged is alleged to have been com-
mitted and who has jurisdiction of such 
offense and is nearest or most accessible 
with reference to the place where said 
arrest is made, in any of the following 
cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands 
an immediate appearance before a mag-
istrate. 
* * * * * * 
(4) In any other event when the per-
son arrested refuses to give his written 
promise to appear in court as hereinafter 
provided, or when in the discretion of the 
arresting officer, a written promise to 
appear is insufficient. 
On appeal the defendant contends that 
the statute under which he was charged 
and convicted is invalid in view of the pro-
visions of Article I, Section 14, of the 
Ltah. Constitution, which reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure 
ln their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no 
'• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
20 L.Ed.2d S89. 
2 
1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
Henry
 Vm rjm s., 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 
4
 L.Ed.2d 134; Wong Sun v. U. S.t 371 U.S. 
541 P^d—51 
warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
While the particular problem raised has 
not been before this court, the language 
of the Utah Constitution was taken verba-
tim from the language of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. The United States Su-
preme Court in dealing with the particular 
problem in the case of Terry v. Ohio,1 at 
page 16 of the U. S. Reports, 88 S.Ct. at 
page 1877 had this to say: "It is quite plain 
that the Fourth Amendment covers 'sei-
zures' of the person which do not eventuate 
in a trip to the station house and prosecu-
tion for crime—'arrests' in traditional ter-
minology. It must be recognized that when-
ever a police officer accosts an individual 
and restrains his freedom to walk away, 
he has 'seized' that person." That case 
went on to hold that arrests without a war-
rant may only be made upon probable cause. 
Other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court 
are to the same effect.2 
The language of the particular statute 
we are here dealing with is undoubtedly 
subject to the constitutional challenge of 
vagueness. That part of the statute "re-
gardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest" may be subject, to various 
meanings and interpretations. If the in-
tention of the legislature was to penalize 
a law-abiding citizen by incarceration be-
cause he did not willingly submit to an un-
lawful arrest, a statute authorizing the 
same is in violation of both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions as above re-
ferred to in that it permits and authorizes 
an arrest without probable cause and with-
out lawful basis for the arrest, Likewise 
the word "interferes" as used in the stat-
ute without further definition or elabora-
471, 83 S.Ct, 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Wright v. 
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L. 
Ed.2d 349; People v. Curtis, 70 CalJ>d 347, 
74 CaLRptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33. 
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tion may mean any protest or verbal remon-
stration with an officer as well as the em-
ployment of physical force to avoid an ar-
rest. We are of the opinion that the lan-
guage of the statute as above pointed out 
fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is 
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct 
sought to be proscribed. The statute in the 
particulars above referred to is in violation 
of the Constitution of this State and the 
United States and therefore invalid. 
This matter is reversed and remanded to 
the district court to dismiss the complaint. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice (concurring). 
I concur, the while conceding that this 
may be a close case, and that the argu-
ments of the dissents about law and order 
and the integrity of the constabulary, are 
peals of optimism for a desired socio-politi-
cal community. Nonetheless, I am con-
vinced that they have neglected the liberty 
bell, whose chimes presumably reach the 
ears not only of the shackler but the shack-
lee, and presumably reflect each's constitu-
tional prerogative of equality,—the hall-
mark of which is reasonableness. I take 
it that any set of circumstances that out-
distances such sounds might be said to 
constitute a journey out of the realm of 
constitutionality as we understand it. 
In this case the officer in the first in-
stance said he was going to issue the de-
fendant a citation for driving while his li-
cense was suspended. He did not arrest 
him, or threaten him with an arrest. Mil-
lions of citations are issued daily without 
an arrest. The defendant did not object 
to a citation, nor did he resist an arrest at 
that time, but drove away a short distance 
followed by the officer, who arrested him, 
claiming he resisted arrest,—not borne out 
by the facts.1 
I. One of the dissents suggests that we must 
ignore the facts, they being the function of 
the jury. Another suggestion seems apropos 
that without the facts, the unconstitutionality 
of a statute is a subject only of a declaratory 
The confrontation here was attended by 
the officer drawing his pistol,—necessary 
perhaps, in a television scenario, but hard-
ly under the circumstances of this case. 
True it is, as the dissent urges, that the 
circumstances of a case may have nothing 
to do with the constitutionality of a statute, 
—but they may have everything to do with 
the question of unconstitutionality of a stat-
ute applicable to the facts and basic issue 
here. They had a lot to do with Hitlerism, 
and in my opinion, the subject statute con-
ceivably may be knocking at the door of 
some such eventuality. In such case I dif-
fer with my dissenting learned colleagues 
to the effect that the prevailing presump-
tion is in favor of constitutionality justify-
ing a six-month stretch in jail. In my book, 
where there is a statute that sanctions an 
arrest of a citizen by a "recognized" law 
enforcement officer, popularly looked up-
on as a person in a blue, brass-buttoned 
suit, ornamented with a silver* star over his 
heart (but who may be an imposter in rent-
ed garb), which citizen is minding his own 
business, as here, where the non-interfer-
ence was non-violent but simply by driving 
away, "regardless of whether there is a 
legal basis for the arrest or not, as was the 
case here, just has to be unconstitutional. 
In such case, the presumption in favor of 
constitutionality successfully is rebutted, 
and as generally is the rule, disappears, and 
the presumption of innocence that always 
attends a defendant, destroys the former, 
the latter to persist. Facts well may be 
instrumental in its persistence. 
The dissents say there is no constitutional 
question here since there is no search 
and seizure problem involved. The main 
opinion points to Terry v. Ohio 2 and other 
authorities3 that seem to disagree,—which 
authorities have my preference over such 
unsupported generality. 
judgement that ignores the fact of consti-
tutional right of liberty. 
2. Footnote 1, main opinion. 
3. Footnote 2, main opinion. 
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 refoec:fully disagree with the gratuity 
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 c ne oi the dissents to the effect that 
A'owhere in the statute can it be found 
•hat an unreasonable arrest is permitted or 
encouraged." I suggest the subject statute 
scth permits and encourages an unreason-
2v;e—and I think unconstitutional—arrest 
when it says it is unlawful to interfere with 
a -jaw enforcement official,"4 who tries 
:o make an arrest "whether there is a legal 
bcsis for the arrest" or not. In other 
•xords, a peaceful citizen is forced by legis-
lation to become his own jail bait if he "in-
terferes" 5 with a law enforcement official 
making an arrest, no matter how outra-
geous, vicious or stupid it may be,—and if 
such citizen uses means that the statute 
Utah 803 
ever except to touch his fellow townsman, 
an officer, and actually walked away from 
an incident that the officer, not he, cre-
ated. 
sterns by implication or legerdemain, to be 
in arbitrary exercise of poor judgment, 
but in doing so interferes with an officer, 
—it costs him six months deprivation of 
his liberty. 
Consider also, the case where an over-
zealous, eager officer obviously is using 
excessive force to subdue a teenager to the 
point where bystanders honestly believe he 
is about to kill him, or where a drunken 
officer with a badge is arresting and beat-
ing a perfectly innocent citizen, or where 
a cop at a football stadium goes berserk 
and at the point of a gun attempts to ar-
rest everyone in front of him, or a game 
warden, in a remote wilderness area, out 
of sheer suspicion manhandles a hunter 
minding his own business, or an off-duty 
law enforcement officer in civilian clothes, 
but "recognized" as a Bobbie, tries to ar-
rest his neighbor on a trumped-up charge, 
or this very case, where the officer ar-
rested an innocent person who had a valid 
teense, who offered no interference what-
The facts and hypothetics recited here 
are not for the purpose of deciding this 
case on the facts, which one of the dissents 
erroneously said we could do, but to dem-
onstrate the vagueness of the statute, and 
the door it opens ostensibly, on a pretext 
of false constitutionality, to events leading 
to an unconstitutional invasion of the con-
stitutional right against unreasonable sei-
zure, a guaranteed right of privacy and a 
constitutional assurance of right of free lo-
comotion and freedom from harassment and 
incarceration,—all in virtue of a statute 
that presents a ridiculous discrimination in 
favor of a law enforcement official and 
against an erstwhile law-abiding citizen 
who becomes a jailbird at the expense of 
the mistaken, and what is worse, the illegal 
act of an arresting official. To me this 
adds up to an Eleventh Commandment, to 
go hence and defy the law hiding behind 
a badge, and let him who is without sin, 
but interferes in the lawlessness, to serve 
the sentence. 
It seems to me to be somewhat of a de-
parture from reality and practicality and 
even morality to say a statute is constitu-
tional that says one person can violate the 
law and by virtue of such illegal act induce 
another to indulge in a confrontation which 
he did not seek and get six months because 
a possible tormenter, acting illegally, goad-
ed him into it. It is a rather superficial 
answer to say, as do the dissenters here, 
that having perhaps unwittingly "inter-
fered" in an arrest, with the sometimes 
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that 
*• Vvhich could be numbered in the dozens, such 
w sheriffs, deputies, city policemen, town 
Policemen, school crossing guards, constables, 
town marshals, judges of various ttues, game 
hardens, treasury agents, tax collectors, cam-
Pus policemen, truant officers, forest rangers, 
Justices of the peace, district court judges, 
v-upreme Court Justices, sanitarians, agricul-
ural agents, special police, meter maids, etc., 
ad infinitum. 
. •'Interferes" carries with it a multiple con-
notation so vague as to render a statute un-
constitutional, in my opinion. Does one inter-
fere with an officer if he heckles him, refuses 
to leave the scene of a demonstration in which 
a person is being arrested, is a curiosity 
seeker at a fire where a suspected arsonist is 
being apprehended, a physician attempting to 
administer to a dying man who is being ar-
rested, etc.? 
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someone "might" attach to the word, the 
"interferer," acting in good faith, not hav-
ing read this funny statute, should be con-
tent to lose his job, his good name in the 
community, his liberty for six months, and 
his respect for the establishment, in ex-
change for the great privilege of hiring a 
lawyer, going to court to seek damages 
(which are no substitute for loss of free-
dom),—all because one of the countless 
hordes of law enforcement officials not on-
ly committed a pediculous, but illegal rip-off 
in making what is worse, the arrest of a 
person who at common law had a perfect 
right to resist, and who, but for this pa-
ternalistic, autocratic legislation in a free 
society, could resist arrest, and who as of 
now, can resist arrest if it happens to be 
classified as a citizen's arrest. 
This statute does not have any semblance 
of a reasonable, constitutional statute pre-
faced by a warning requirement of some 
kind, a reasonable request that the citizen 
show something, or that under the circum-
stances "probable cause" appears to justify 
an arrest, or "that there is reason to be-
lieve an offense has been or is about to 
be committed." 
One of the dissents asserts that it ap-
pears that the majority "is influenced by 
the facts of the case and seeks an impermis-
sible way to correct what it considers a 
bad verdict." Although this statement may 
be permissible gratuity as to others in the 
majority triumvirate, it is not so as to this 
author, since he was influenced by the pro-
visions of the statute as being a constitu-
tionally impermissible way to correct what 
I consider to be a bad and vague treatment 
of a citizen's constitutional right. 
One of the dissents suggests that "The 
main opinion is at some pains to explain 
how the police officer could have handled 
this apparently arrogant and belligerent 
defendant in a different manner." It does 
not take much imagination to answer that 
question. The officer easily could have 
6. Two other cases cited in the dissent, Rosen-
berg v. State, and State v. Byrne, are Florida 
cases decided in Appellate Division Courts, in-
ferior courts not having the authoritative 
checked with the Motor Vehicle De«ar 
ment, to determine if his fellow townsrroa 
had a valid license, in which event he WGU'H 
have found that he did have such lic»^^. 
Or he calmly could have handed a citatic-
to defendant or placed it on his car, or left 
it at his home, or mailed it to him. It jJ 
suggested that the dissent "is at some pains* 
to explain why the officer did not do on* 
of the things mentioned above, or why 
impetuous, unreasonable police officer 
threatened the defendant by drawing his-
gun, and why he committed a breach of 
the peace in the process of what proved to 
be an unlawful arrest,—an act the pre-
vention of which the dissents both say was 
the very purpose of the statute they say i$' 
salutary in keeping the peace. 
In passing, it is noted that neither of the 
dissents cites any authority that really suj>-
ports the rule provided in the statute here. 
One, Miller z\ State, a 1969 Alaska case 
(462 P.2d 421), at first blush would seen 
to. It may be pointed out, however, that 
the court there laid down a rule of law 
having no codification, which was similar] 
to the provisions of our statute, saying that' 
at least one state court had recommended, 
such a rule as a matter of its common law 
development, being State v. Koonce, 89 
NJ .Super . 169, 214 A.2d 428, 1965,—an in-
termediate court but not the court of last 
resort, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
However, the Miller case, supra, pulled 
its punches on any constitutionality ques-
tion, which was not even raised in the case, 
when it said "It should be noted that the 
rule we formulate today has no application 
when the arrestee apprehends bodily in-
jury, or when an unlawful arrest is attempt-
ed by one not known to be a peace officer. 
Quite different problems are then present 
On the strength of such hedging, it is sug-
gested that this case, the only one cited in 
the dissent, certainly would be undispositive 
in an attack on a statute's constitutionality 
on the ground of vagueness.8 
wefeht of the Florida Supreme Court, havinl 
the same subordinate stature of State * 
Koonce, supra. 
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'caionable seizure. 
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ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I can agree that there was no basis for 
j n arrest, but cannot agree that the statute 
is contrary to the provision of our constitu-
tion. It does not permit an unlawful seiz-
ure (arrest). It merely transfers the right 
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the or-
derly procedure of a court trial instead of 
a brawl in the streets.1 
The question of lawfulness of an arrest 
may be a close one, and a brawl may result 
in a killing. The legislature was wise in 
passing the statute in question in the in-
terest of maintaining order and preventing 
confrontations which might lead to blood-
shed. Nowhere in the statute can it be 
found that an unreasonable seizure (ar-
rest) is permitted or encouraged. There is 
no change in the law that one making an 
unlawful arrest must answer for it, and 
so there is no basis for saying the statute 
conflicts with the Constitution. 
The common law gave a person the right 
to resist an unlawful arrest, but times have 
changed since the time when self-help was 
permitted to prevent a wrongful arrest. 
At common law, arrests were often made 
by citizens. Judges were not available for 
speedy release on bond, and trials were long 
delayed. Such conditions no longer exist. 
An arrested person must be taken forth-
with before a magistrate, and trials must 
not be unreasonably delayed.2 A defend-
'• Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 
1969) ; Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68; 
State v. Byrne, 311 So.2d 764; See Annota-
tion in 44 A.L.R. 3rd at p. 1087 for cases 
holding it a crime to resist a known officer 
when making an arrest even absent a statute 
like ours. 
2
- Art. I, Sec. 12, Utah Const. 
3
- Art. I, Sec. 9, Utah Const. 
4
- Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Utah Const. 
5
- Sec. 78-3-5, U.C.A.1953. 
to bail in a reasonable 
amount.3 Besides the statute does not pre-
vent resistance to an unlawful arrest when 
made by a private person. It only applies 
to arrests made by a known police officer. 
By both our constitution4 and statute,5 
the ruling of the district court in cases ap-
pealed from a justice of the peace court is 
final except as to cases involving the con-
stitutionality of a statute.6 This matter is 
such a case, and so we must limit our re-
view to the determination of whether the 
statute is invalid. We may not review the 
facts of the case. 
It appears that the prevailing opinion is 
influenced by the facts of the case and 
seeks an impermissible way to correct what 
it considers a bad verdict. 
That is the function of the trial court— 
not that of an appellate tribunal. If we 
wish to be jurors, we should renounce our 
position as justices and wait until our 
names are drawn for jury service. 
In reviewing a statute to ascertain its 
constitutionality, certain rules of construc-
tion must be applied: 
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed 
to bs valid and in conformity with the con-
stitution.7 
(b) It should not be held to be invalid un-
less it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be incompatible with some particular 
constitutional provision.8 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity 
of an ordinance or statute is upon the one 
who makes the challenge.9 
6. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 
41, affd. 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed. 
603; (1897) ; State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 
200 P. S94, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921) ; American 
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 
249 (1930). 
7. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) ; 
Smw v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.24 
234 (1948). 
8. Cases cited note 1 3upra. 
9. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Tnn oiir Inc., supra note 7. 
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In the case of State v. Packard10 it was 
said: 
It is recognized that statutes should not 
be declared unconstitutional if there is 
any reasonable basis upon which they may 
be sustained as falling within the con-
stitutional framework [citations omit-
ted], and that a statute will not be held 
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensi-
ble, practical effect may be given it. 
[Citations omitted]. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
in Roth v. U. S11 said: 
. . . This Court, however, has con-
sistently held that lack of precision is 
not itself offensive to the requirement 
of due process. ". . . [T]he Con-
stitution does not require impossible 
standards"; all that is required is that 
the language "conveys sufficiently defi-
nite warning as to the proscribed conduct 
when measured by common understand-
ing and practices . . . " United 
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S. 
Ct. 1538,91 L.Ed. 1877. 
The case of Sunset Amusement Co. v. 
Board of Police Commissioners of City of 
Los Angeles12 is in point: 
It should be kept in mind 
that there are an infinite variety of ac-
tivities or conduct which could result in 
potential or actual danger to the "peace. 
health, safety, convenience, good morals, 
and general welfare" of the public. A 
municipality cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to isolate and specify those precise 
activities or conduct which are intended 
to be proscribed. As stated in Daniel 
[Daniel v. Board of Police Com'rs, 190 
Cal.App.2d 566, 12 Cal.Rptr. 226] quoting 
from an earlier case, "To make a statute 
sufficiently certain to comply with con-
10. 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563 
(1952). 
Ilu 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 
lL.Ed.2dl498 Q956). 
stitutional requirements [of due proceu 
of law] it is not necessary tha: it fUr 
nishes detailed plans and speci:;cati0r 
of the acts or conduct prohibited** 
The author of the prevailing opinion an-
parently doubts that the statute violates the 
constitutional provision regarding unrea-
sonable seizures as claimed by the app
€
\9 
lant. He seems to buttress the decision on 
the constitutional challenge of vagueness 
This claim is personal to the author of the 
opinion, and was not raised either at trial 
or on appeal. 
I can see nothing vague about the lan-
guage of the statute in question. Any per-
son of ordinary intelligence should know 
that when a known officer is making, or 
attempting to make, an arrest, self-help or 
lay interference is prohibited by the law. 
In my opinion the statute is not uncon-
stitutional, and we are duty bound to so 
say and to affirm the judgment. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting). 
With due respect to our disagreeing col-
leagues, I am impelled to state that the raa-^ 
jority opinion impresses me as a strained 
effort to cast the statute in a light different 
from its true intent and meaning for tht 
purpose of making it appear to be uncon-
stitutional and striking it down. It is my' 
judgment that such a ruling is contrary to 
sound principles of law and considerations 
of policy. In addition to the cogent and 
correct observations of Justice Ellett, in-
cluding: that a legislative enactment should 
not be so nullified unless it is violative of 
some constitutional provision beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, I offer some further com-
ments. 
First, I re-emphasize that this statmc 
does not authorize a peace officer to ma*t 
12. 7 Cal.3d te, 101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 773, 496 
P.2d 840, 8Ao (1972). 
STATE v. BRADSHAW 
Cite as 541 P.2d SCO 
Utah 807 
.jniazvful arrest. Nor does it authorize 
.-e seizure of any person or property. It 
:-e- not deal with when or under what cir-
...prances the lawful arrest may be made. 
T-.a: subject is dealt with elsewhere in the 
'aw.1 Neither does it in any way adverse-
ly affect or deprive any person who is sub-
jected to an improper or unlawful arrest 
o: any right or remedy he has always had 
under the law. It seems inescapably plain 
:o me that the sole purpose of this statute 
is to safeguard against interference with a 
tcjice officer zi'ho is attempting to make 
211 arrest, to the end that violence may be 
avoided. 
This statute may be different than you 
or I. or the other justices of this court may 
desire it to be, or would have drafted it, 
had that been their responsibility. But I 
certainly do not think it is beyond the realm 
of rationality to see it as the expressed will 
of the people of this State, acting through 
their legislature, that when any duly au-
thorized peace officer is attempting to 
make an arrest, no citizen should interfere 
with him. If the arrest proves to be im-
proper or unlawful, whoever is aggrieved 
thereby is not without the remedies the law 
gives him, both in that case if it comes to 
court, and/or in another if he wants to sue. 
All this statute does is to make it a mis-
demeanor if he presumes to judge the law-
fulness of the arrest, and interferes with 
the officer in the performance of his duty. 
In considering whether it is within the 
power of the state legislature to enact such 
a statute it is important to have in mind 
that, as contrasted to the federal govern-
ment, which has only those powers express-
ly granted to it, the legislature of this State 
has all of the powers of sovereignty, ex-
cept only as expressly limited or prohibited 
!
- See Title 77, Ch. 13, Utah Code Ann.1953. 
2- To avoid repetition on this subject here, 
see statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 
by the constitution.'3 It therefore has the 
power to enact any law or regulation cal-
culated to preserve the peace and good or-
der of the citizenry, unless some constitu-
tional provision prohibits it. 
The provision of our Constitution quoted 
and relied on as nullifying the statute is 
Section 14, Article I, relating to searches 
and seizures. It is submitted that if that 
section is considered in its total context, 
as rules of construction require, it will be 
seen that the purpose of that section is in 
accordance with its title "Unreasonable 
searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant"; 
and that it is dealing with the invasion of 
privacy by unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures of persons, houses, papers and effects 
and when the issuance of a warrant is 
necessary for that purpose, and not with 
the matter of making an arrest of the na-
ture involved here. I therefore do not see 
how that constitutional provision can prop-
erly be regarded as preventing the legisla-
ture from enacting a peace and good order 
statute such as the one in question, nor 
how it has any application to the situation 
dealt with in this case. 
We should look at the composite of this 
fact situation in a light supportive of the 
jury verdict, approved by the trial court 
in his denial of motion to set it aside. But, 
let it be conceded that the police officer 
may have been mistaken concerning the de-
fendant's having a revoked driver's license. 
The main opinion is at some pains to ex-
plain how the police officer could have 
handled this apparently arrogant and in-
solent defendant in a different manner. It 
wholly ignores the proposition that if this 
defendant had not been a person of that 
disposition, and if he had a valid driver's 
license on him as the law requires, he could 
359, 374 P.2d 516, and authorities therein 
cited. 
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have avoided any difficulty for himself 
or the police officer by simply so stating 
and exhibiting the license. But he chose 
th t contrary course which resulted m the 
difficulty in which he finds himself. 
I cannot see it as consistent with my ju-
dicial duty in the light of what I regard 
as correct principles of law and sound policy 
to align myself with the position of this 
defendant who obviously manifests a dis-
position to flout the law and authority, and 
place the burden of exemplary behavior 
on the peace officer who is trying to en-
force and uphold it. It is my impression 
that, quite different from the view taken 
by the jurors and the trial judge, the pos-
sibility exists that some members of the 
court may view the fact situation in this 
case as offensive to their sense of justice. 
If this be so, and the ends of justice re-
quire overturning the verdict, this court 
could very well do so by deciding that the 
peace officer was wrong and that there 
was no justification for finding that the 
defendant was "interfering" with the peace 
officer making an arrest. I could not agree 
with that solution, believing that to be the 
prerogative of the jury and the trial court. 
But in my judgment that would be a solu-
tion more nearly rational and in conformity 
with proper judicial function and preroga-
tive than to strike the statute down to rec-
tify one seemingly harsh case. This would 
also be in harmony with the well-estab-
lished principle of constitutional law: that 
the court should not declare a statute un-
constitutional if the case can be decided on 
other grounds.3 
In any event, it should be indicated that 
it is unconstitutional only as apptttd when 
a person resists arrest as to himself or his 
family, and not remove its effect from oth-
er situations where its salutary purpose 
should be preserved. 
3. See Heathman v. Giles, 18 Utah 2 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Lewis A. BANKS, Jr., Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 13996. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 2, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted after trial by 
jury in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., of aggravated 
assault. Defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court held that it was not error to 
admit into evidence a pistol which had 
been seized in close proximity to where de-
fendant was arrested and which was suffi-
ciently similar to the gun used that gun ad-
mitted into evidence could serve for illus-
trative purposes. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>404(4) 
In prosecution wherein defendant was 
convicted of aggravated assault, it was not 
error to admit into evidence pistol which 
had been seized in close proximity to 
where defendant was arrested and which 
was sufficiently similar to gun used that 
gun admitted into evidence could serve for 
illustrative purposes. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-
102(1)(c), 76-5-103(1)(b), (2). 
2. Searches and Seizures €=>3.3(5) 
Where gun was found in close prox-
imity to where defendant was arrested, of-
ficers had right to take it for their own 
protection. 
Jack W. Kunkler, Salt Lake Legal De-
i tnd t r Assn., Salt Lakt City ior dtittv&ut 
and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
368, 374 P.2d S39; 16 Am.Jur.2d 301. 
42nd Utah State Legislature, House Bill No. 85, Recording No. 3, Side 1 (January 19,1981) 
Sponsor Rep. Orval C. Harrison: This bill deals with the crime of resisting arrest. If you were to 
look into your Utah Code to76-8-305 you would not find that statute in the book-instead it would 
say unconstitutional. The (unintelligible) court in the case of State v. Bradshaw declared 
unconstitutional the statute dealing with resisting arrest. I believe it was declared unlawful was 
because primarily it did not require an affirmative showing by the prosecution that the arrest was 
a lawful arrest. Consequently we have put together a statute here by the statewide association of 
prosecutors that were involved in this which would now redefine this crime to require a lawful 
arrest, (unintelligible) passed to you a memorandum that explains the situation what we are 
trying to do is to get on the books a statute that would define the crime of resisting arrest. It 
would require a lawful arrest and I would be glad to respond to any questions if there are any. 
Mr. Speaker-Mr. Hilliard (unintelligible) 
Mr. Hilliard: Mr. Speaker this is not to a (unintelligible) I had my light on before this bill in it 
(unintelligible) 
Mr Speaker: Mr. Gardner: 
(Unintelligible) 
Mr. Gardner: Could you tell me what an unlawful arrest is? 
Sponsor: An unlawful arrest, of course, we are talking in general terms, would be an arrest when 
the officer is attempting to effect an arrest did not have reasonable grounds or cause to do so 
without probable cause and in anyway try to effect an arrest which is unlawful. 
(Speaker's name is unitelligible): 
I've guess what's covered here is not that I have told you concepts, but what is troubling me is 
that there seems to me to be a matter of judgment to what is lawful or unlawful. I might think it 
is unlawful because I have not done anything wrong and I guess how do-who makes the decision 
as to whether there is sufficient reason. 
Sponsor: Let me respond to that by indicating that what is or is not a lawful arrest I am sure is a 
subject matter of numerous different philosophies and court decisions and I don't involve myself 
in the practice of criminal law so I could not define it too well but I sure-as I-(unintelligible) the 
ultimate decision as to what is a lawful arrest would be something decided by court decisions. 
And, I might add that also the statute we have here has been patterned after a California statute 
that has been declared to be Constitutional. -\ thank you. 
Speaker: Representative Hilliard 
Rep. Hilliard: would representative Harrison yield to another question. 
Sponsor: Yes 
Rep. Hilliard: Has consideration been given to the potential problem of a-say a knock on a door 
at 2 o'clock in the morning and a man saying he is a police officer and then proceeding to come 
into a home for some reason and you seek to protect yourself or your home a-(unintelligible) for 
some protection(unintelligible) and a police officer to be either properly identified or some kind 
of protection for a private citizen who may be concerned about somebody he does not know for 
sure not to be a police officer? 
Sponsor: Yes-a- the bill expressly requires that the person who is charged with the offense of 
resisting a lawful arrest must have knowledge that the person is a police officer or else in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have information sufficient to be put on notice that the 
individual was a peace officer. So if the peace officer stops and identifies himself or if no 
reasonable basis for the person charged to know it was a police officer then the elements of the 
crime would not be made out. 
Speaker: Representative Christensen: 
Rep. Christensen: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I don't know how many of you have been arrested I 
hope not that many- but by the record there were 304 (unintelligile) while they were trying to 
arrest you and I for breaking the law. I think this is too high a number and I support this bill. 
Speaker: I see no further lights of persons wishing to speak to the bill. Representative Harrison 
would you like to sum up. 
Harrison: I think that it has been adequately covered thank you. 
